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I.   Introduction  
 Unemployment is a primary source of lost income in labor markets.  Yet, after a century 
of economic research, the determinants of the ‘natural’ rate or equilibrium level of unemployment 
are not fully understood.  According to World Bank data, the U.S. has an unemployment rate of 
less than 6 percent, while Spain has nearly 20 percent.  In Africa, unemployment rates extensively 
vary across countries from 3 to above 90 percent.   The focus of research is to identify labor-market 
uniqueness such as the percentage of the labor force participating in a trade union, the amount and 
type of job protection offered, or the type and extent of unemployment benefits.   
 There is an interest, however, in understanding the relationship between unemployment 
and the local housing market.  As with unemployment, homeownership rates greatly vary across 
the world with near-80 percent homeownership in Spain and 30 percent homeownership in 
Switzerland.  The levels of unemployment and homeownership on a national level vary across the 
globe, as well as on a state and local level in the U.S.  This paper is motivated by the latter, a micro 
view of the state and regional housing market, as well as the impact on unemployment in the 
United States.  
One of the important interactions is between housing and labor markets.  The usual 
assumption is that there exists a positive relationship between unemployment and homeownership.  
This has become known as the theory or hypothesis of Oswald (Oswald, 1996, 1997, 1999). 
Oswald argues that high unemployment, as well as rigid unemployment differentials among 
regional labor markets, is positively correlated with homeownership.  Oswald claims that a higher 
homeownership rate results in increased levels of immobile homeowners across regions because 
the associated costs of buying and selling homes prevent them from relocating.  In other words, 




demand for labor to an alternative, more prosperous region with a higher demand. As a result, 
higher levels of homeownership are presumed to limit interregional relocation and restrict regional 
labor markets.  Restricted labor markets are less able to return to equilibrium following localized 
labor demand shocks. The theory of a positive relationship between unemployment and 
homeownership is the basis for a plethora of other areas of study including the notions of spatial 
mismatch unemployment presented by Layard et al. (1991), Holzer (1991), and others. 
In the U.S., both Democratic and Republican government officials encourage increasing 
homeownership rates.  Both political parties highlight the recent rise in homeownership as a 
national achievement.  Since the Great Depression, the American government has made great 
efforts to simplify the path to homeownership for all citizens.  According to the 2008 White House 
CRS Report to Congress, through the use of government sponsored entities (GSEs) such as Freddie 
Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks, the U.S. government guarantees $6.5 trillion 
in assets with the purpose of promoting homeownership.  Homeownership is further promoted by 
tax policy which allows homeowners to deduct mortgage interest payments for a primary residence 
or a second home.  However, the Federal government has done little to educate the American 
populace on the use and access of credit markets or mortgage instruments in the pursuit of 
homeownership.  Politicians believe that homeownership creates a tie and commitment to the 
community, and is thus, a net positive for the local economy and the nation as a whole.  As 
President Obama said in a speech given to Desert Vista High School on August 6, 2013, “So that's 
one of the things about housing.  It is not just important for the person who owns the house; our 
economy is so impacted by everything that happens in housing.” Homeownership helps to “build 




Homeownership and unemployment rates are important macro and microeconomic 
indicators often used, individually or together, to gauge the health of the economy in a particular 
region or of the national economy.  The housing market is of a particular interest following the 
Great Recession.  The Great Recession was a severe economic downturn caused by a plethora of 
market events including a credit crunch in 2007 after a prolonged housing market boom.  
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) records, the Great Recession resulted in the highest 
unemployment levels seen in more than a generation in the developed world.  
This research studies the possible effects of the housing market on unemployment rates in 
the United States through an alternative measurement of liquidity rather than homeownership or 
nominal movements. Housing is an important component of the economy affecting regional and 
national unemployment through labor mobility, potentially limiting employment opportunities and 
income growth.  There is not, however, an appropriate and efficient variable to measure the 
relationship between housing markets and unemployment.  Most research looks at housing as a 
restriction, creating a ‘lock-in’ effect whereby homeowners are unable to move to areas that offer 
increased job opportunities due to an illiquid asset holding.  In this case, housing restricts the 
homeowner to the job opportunities within a certain radius around the home.  If unable to sell the 
home, the owner can’t move to an alternative location.  The very nature of the lock-in effect, 
however, suggests that ownership itself is not enough to create immobility.  The lock-in effect is 
created due to a lack of liquidity that allows housing assets to be bought and sold quickly and 
easily.  
This study proposes a measure of price spread between the bid (or the offer price from the 
buyer) and the ask (or the list price of the seller) in order to isolate the effect of housing market 




equilibrium and unemployment at the state and regional levels.  In other words, bid-ask price 
spread accounts for the liquidity or the ability of the housing market to clear.  This proxy for 
housing market liquidity offers a more thorough measure of housing liquidity or market clearing 
ability compared with the current literature, which has relied on price or price changes alone as the 
primary measure of activity in the housing market such as Chan (2001), and Gupta and Miller 
(2009).  Price alone does not account for liquidity.  Rather, the ratio between what a seller is asking 
and a buyer is willing to pay more clearly captures liquidity.  The larger the price spread, the more 
illiquid the asset.  This study provides facts consistent with the hypothesis that the housing market 
plays an essential role as a determinant of regional unemployment.   
 This study uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to construct state panels 
in order to estimate unemployment equations.  The BLS provides unemployment data from an 
eligible sample of 60,000 Americans selected randomly.  In addition, Zillow.com, a leading on-
line source for home sales, provides detailed listing and sales data.  The housing market spread 
variable is constructed from the database on Zillow.com.   
 This paper explores the effect of regional housing market price spread on unemployment. 
Chapter II reviews the literature focusing on i) housing liquidity or market clearing ability and ii) 
housing models that include unemployment.  Housing liquidity is isolated to explain movements 
in unemployment rates across regions of the United States.  Chapter III presents the housing market 
and unemployment data, as well as the LSDV model to estimate the effect of regional housing 
market liquidity on unemployment.  The model of housing market price spreads justifies the use 
of this unique measure as an appropriate indicator of housing market liquidity.  The proxy of 




through LSDV regression on the state and regional level.  Chapter V reviews the results and 






II.   Literature Review  
 Interest in the relationship between unemployment and housing or more specifically 
homeownership is triggered by extensive research.  Andrew Oswald is among many exploring the 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment rates before the most recent housing 
market crisis of the early 2000s.  Oswald studies the relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment across states and regions in the U.S. as well as across European countries, generally 
concluding a positive relationship.  In other words, Oswald concludes that rising homeownership 
leads to a rise in the rate of unemployment.  Homeownership acts to slow the ability of jobless 
homeowners to relocate to new areas that offer more employment opportunities.   
 Drawing a direct parallel between homeownership and employment seems unrealistic 
given the other relevant variables.  After all, homeownership in and of itself is not necessarily 
mobility-restrictive if there is adequate liquidity in the marketplace to absorb changes in housing 
demand and supply.  Thus, a measure of housing market liquidity or the clearing ability of the 
market is better suited to measure the fluidity of state and regional housing markets.  The most 
appropriate measure of liquidity remains the price spread between the buyer and seller of an asset 
or the bid-ask spread.  The larger the spread, the less liquid the asset.   
 Additionally, a measure of housing liquidity is a potentially better proxy for the lock-in 
affect housing has on labor.  Similarly, the health of the housing market, and a gauge of the ability 
of the local market to support additional housing activity via offers and purchases, is a better 







II.1.  Historical Relationship between Housing and Unemployment  
 Policy makers often assume that unemployment and housing prices have a negative 
correlation: when unemployment is down, home prices are up.  However, there are few 
relationships in economics that are rigidly fixed.  H9ousing prices and unemployment are vital 
measures of the U.S. economy and of particular concern to policy makers, but limited studies have 
clearly defined the relationship between these two variables. While the unemployment rate is often 
included in housing market literature, the unemployment rate itself is most often not the main focus 
of study.  Rather, the unemployment rate is used as an explanatory variable.   
 Nearly all Western countries throughout history have experienced a time of joblessness.  
According to a 2008 Eurostat Euro-Indicators Data Report, most European countries experience 
periods of high unemployment.  According to Oswald (1996,1999), these periods of high 
unemployment correlate with policies aimed to increase homeownership.  In Greece, for example, 
where homeownership exceeds 80 percent, the unemployment rate is over 20 percent.   Since the 
1950s, homeownership is on the rise in Europe as a result of policies, such as reduced taxes 
designed to encourage homeownership.  In Spain, according to Eurostat data, homeownership is 
near 80 percent compared to less than 40 percent following the Second World War.  Even in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, European governments continue to offer financial support to 
encourage homeownership.  Most of Western Europe offers access to credit to supplement the shift 
from rental housing to homeownership.  These practices, however, are at odds with the hypothesis 
that economies require flexibility. In an ever-changing world, regional economies benefit from 
mobile labor enabling the shift to new locations in order to find jobs.  Private rental housing assists 
in the need for flexibility. Renters, as opposed to homeowners, are more mobile.  A flexible rental 




From 1950 to 1960, Europe had a low unemployment rate and, while on the rise, a 
relatively low homeownership rate.  Meanwhile, at the same time, the United States had a 
comparatively high homeownership rate of 60 percent and one of the highest unemployment rates 
in the industrialized world.  Nevertheless, reflecting a rise in unionization rather than 
homeownership trends, American policy makers adjusted to a more European model of 
employment policies with a more generous government safety net.  Part of the difference between 
the U.S. and Europe is the high firing costs and more generous unemployment compensation 
offered in Europe.  Since 1960s, homeownership rates in the U.S. are on the rise along with the 
annual average rate of national unemployment.   
By the 1990s, the U.S. homeownership rate was over 64 percent and the unemployment 
rate was 6.1 percent.  By 2004, the U.S. homeownership rate was nearly 69 percent and the 
unemployment rate was 5.0 percent.  All other developed countries, with the exception of Japan 
and Switzerland, observed a rise in unemployment over this period.  Countries with relatively 
higher unemployment rates had relatively faster growth in homeownership. In other words, 
countries with a substantial portion of citizens renting had a lower unemployment rate than 
countries with a majority of people in owner-occupied housing.  
Rapidly increasing homeownership rates and rising home prices reflect easing liquidity 
standards in the postwar era.  In anticipation of robust growth forthcoming in the 1980s, the 
derivative mortgage market expanded beyond initial development.  The derivatives market 
encourages lending via risk pooling for individual financial institutions and widens credit 





The link between housing and unemployment holds within a nation as it does across diverse 
countries. The correlation between homeownership and unemployment, while evident in countries 
and regional economies, however, is not entirely understood.   
 
II.2.  An introduction to Oswald: The Labor Market in Housing Market Models 
 Oswald (1997) claims that the relationship between housing and unemployment is based 
on the perceived notion that housing consumption limits employment opportunities through 
reduced mobility.  In other words, homeownership reduces labor flexibility because of delays and 
difficulties regarding selling a home and limiting employment opportunities.  Oswald (1997) finds 
that homeownership ties or ‘tethers’ individuals to a particular location, making them less willing 
and able to move to areas with more employment opportunities.  Specifically, Oswald concludes 
that generally a 10 percent rise in the rate of homeownership is associated with a 2 percentage 
point increase in unemployment.  
 Oswald (1997) concludes that there is a positive relationship between levels of 
homeownership and joblessness across regions.  Furthermore, he finds that there are significant 
lags in the effect. The impact of higher homeownership rates driving up the rate of unemployment 
lags by five years.  The conclusion that high homeownership gradually undermines the labor 
market is of great concern, motivating further study.  
 Moreover, Oswald (1997) shows that the relationship between homeownership and 
unemployment holds across large and small areas.  He finds that both within and across states, 
areas of elevated homeownership are plagued by low labor mobility.  Interestingly, this is not 




fails to conclude why there is such an unwavering relationship, although, intuitively, the outcomes 
are sensible.  It is reasonable that increased participation in homeownership creates negative 
externalities in local labor markets.  Furthermore, Oswald concludes that elevated homeownership 
rates can cause additional phenomena such as larger congestion periods on roads and bridges, 
increasing travel and commuting costs for employees.  Also, Oswald finds that states with high 
homeownership rates can have regions with relatively low unemployment.  Real estate markets 
are extremely localized and often vary within a state.  This holds true for a state with a high average 
homeownership rate.  
 Building from Blanchard and Katz (1992), Oswald (1997, 1999) models five 
mechanisms to explain the positive relationship between unemployment and homeownership all 
of which lead to a lack of mobility and a lock-in effect.  All of the mechanisms appear to be at 
least in part linked to the extrapolated relationship between decreased labor mobility, 
homeownership and an ineffective labor market clearing mechanism.   
 
II.2.A. High Moving and Social Costs 
 The primary mechanism involves the direct influence of high costs of moving associated 
with homeownership.  This includes not just the costs of physically moving personal items to a 
new location but the financial costs associated with selling and acquiring a new home.  Given 
different levels of tax regulations, the cost of financing including acquiring a home equity loan 
and solicitor fees, results in a high level of expense.  Certainly, the associated costs of moving are 
larger – and in many cases significantly larger – for homeowners than renters.  This suggests that 
homeowners may be unwilling to relocate even if labor market openings in an alternative location 




the unwillingness to relocate can hinder new entrants from entering – or leaving – an existing 
market.   
 The expenses of relocating include the fee of the realtor, closing costs and the overhead 
of renting a moving truck.   They also include the social and household expenses linked with 
relocating.  These can include everything from creating a new social circle of friends, becoming 
involved in a new community, and introducing children into a new school system.  These social 
expenses are real costs and can influence homeowners to remain in their current residence.  When 
coupled with the quantitative monetary expense of relocating, it is understandable that 
homeownership can create a substantial lock-in effect retarding mobility in the labor market and 
restricting homeowners to their current place of residence.   
 
II.2.B. Falling Home Values 
 A marked decline in home values has a negative impact on mobility and impedes the 
flexibility of the labor market.  From the aforementioned argument regarding both the qualitative 
and quantitative costs of moving, it is apparent that property owners are reluctant to move due to 
the related transaction expenses which can include a potential realized loss when selling a home 
for a reduced price.  It is shown that homeowners experience lock-in as housing values drop.  Aside 
from a loss of price appreciation, this dilemma is also rooted in the fact that homeowners typically 
do not have adequate liquid assets to afford a first payment or down payment on an alternative 
residence without first selling their current home.   In other words, many homeowners are reliant 
on the sale of their present home in order to have the financial resources to relocate into a new 





II.2.C. Reduced Capital Investment 
Prolonged inefficiencies in labor markets as a result of immobility produce high costs and 
reduced production.  In the long-run, high costs squeeze businesses from the marketplace lending 
to further jobs losses.  
An immobile labor market disrupts an efficient assignment of resources and leads to a 
certain type of spatial mismatch by which housing market frictions can cause less appropriate and 
inefficient employment matching. In other words, high levels of immobility cause the economy to 
be less efficient.  A misallocation of resources has a detrimental impact on local labor markets by 
raising the cost of production as a result of lower labor productivity.  Higher production costs lead 
to higher market prices and thus, lower real wages and reduced employment opportunities relative 
to a more flexible labor market. 
 Of course, in actuality, homeowners themselves are more likely to limit mobility or 
inhibit commercial growth in or near residential areas.  In a 1999 paper, Oswald proposes that 
homeowners seek to maintain the status-quo, the current composition of persons, as well as the 
balance and location of housing units; homeowners seek to create more stable living environments.  
Homeowners prefer to maintain the tranquility of their neighborhoods and seek to reduce 
development and commercial building, depress business start-ups, and hold back entrepreneurial 
ventures and subsequent job creation. Areas with high homeownership often deter entrepreneurs 
from investing in operations which leads to reduced levels of capital investment because strict and 
onerous developmental laws or limitations on land and commercial development.  Thus, 
businesses themselves are hesitant to open a new factory, or office space, in areas with high 





II.2.D. Commuting Costs 
 Homeowners are willing – or resigned - to commute. The construct of many U.S. cities 
is based on a city center comprised of commercial and residential rental buildings.  Single-family 
homes are most densely populated in the secondary and tertiary layers surrounding urban centers.  
As a result of the proximity to the city center, homeowners travel often and for long periods of 
time.  Longer travel times create congestion and traffic increasing the cost of commuting. High 
travel costs reduce the incentive to work by reducing take-home pay net of commuting costs.  
These costs include gasoline, tolls, vehicle registration, and parking fees, as well as amortization 
of the car, repair and financing costs.  High work-related costs including travel reduce the appeal 
of employment. Similarly, high work-related costs increase the appeal of unemployment.  
 Oswald (1999) remarks that homeowners have a tendency to travel longer distances 
between a residence and location of employment in comparison to renters.  However, an increased 
willingness to travel can result in more dense populations in the surrounding, lower cost areas.  
This phenomenon may have a negative impact on economic growth by hindering occupational 
matching.   This hypothesis dovetails the initial hypothesis that homeowners are less mobile and 
hence, forced to increase their employment search zone – while keeping that zone reasonably 
tethered to their place of residence.   
 
II.2.E. Limited Relocation Options 
 An unemployed homeowner faces two challenges, the loss of a job and the inability to 
relocate into an area with more hiring opportunities. High levels of homeownership limit 
opportunities particularly for younger workers by restricting mobility into new areas offering 




are few low-cost rental options.  Without rental options, those without capital resources to purchase 
a home are at a severe disadvantage in an environment where ownership is the leading form of 
housing.   
 Oswald (1997) focuses on the relationship between unemployment and owner-occupied 
housing in a financial system with heterogeneous locations such as cities with similar 
characteristics for both local housing and labor markets.  Within similar locales, residents face 
similar decisions on whether to purchase or rent a home.   From that point, differences in 
productivity and underlying economic conditions determine different unemployment levels across 
cities, as well as the differing prices of houses and rentals.  The relative cost of renting, the 
underlying property value and the activity level or market liquidity determines housing price 
premiums taking into account the underlying differences in locations. Liquidity itself, however, 
depends on the health of the labor market and the relative strength of the labor market compared 
with nearby or comparable cities.   
   
II.3.  Regional and Local Data Choices  
 According to the American Bankers Association (ABA), homeownership rates are on the 
rise, up nearly 40 percent over the past millennium and rising to 65 percent in 2010. The media 
and policy debates highlight the concern surrounding homeownership and the inconclusive 
relationship with the labor market.  There is concern that homeownership causes friction in the 
labor market.  Modern theory looks into the relationship between homeownership and labor market 
mobility against the backdrop of restrictive homeownership.  The hypothesis is that high 




 The literature explores the relationship between homeownership and unemployment.  In 
several publications, Oswald (1996, 1997, and 1999) dissects the hypothesis that homeownership 
is positively related to labor immobility and unemployment.  This leads to both lower levels of 
income and reduced levels of growth.  Oswald presumes a positive correlation between 
homeownership rates and the level of unemployment across OECD countries.  However, following 
Shelton (1968), later works employ time-series data for the U.S. and render a similar positive 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment.    
 According to Oswald (1997), unemployment increases most noticeably in counties with 
the fastest development in homeownership.  This relationship holds even on the city level.  
According to a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) report on the housing 
market in Detroit-Warren-Livonia, Michigan, the Detroit MSA market is a recent example of this 
relationship.  Following the Great Recession in the United States, employees in Michigan, once 
General Motors workers, find themselves in the midst of a deteriorating local labor market.  
Unemployed workers who own their home cannot find a buyer and therefore cannot relocate to 
other areas of the state or country that have more favorable employment opportunities.  This is an 
unending downward spiral with no simple solution.   
 Amid a massive array of study and lingering theoretical uncertainty, the correlation 
between homeownership and labor mobility, as well as unemployment, is an empirical matter.  On 
a macroeconomic level, a number of studies including Barcelo (2006) demonstrate that elevated 
homeownership levels escalate unemployment.  However, the relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment remains inconclusive.  Furthermore, it varies across data 
subsectors; macro state and country level data and micro city and metropolitan statistical area level 




II.3.A. Country level data 
 Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999) concludes that, particularly for Europe, high levels of 
homeownership are associated with higher rates of unemployment.  In a study of 19 OECD 
countries from 1960 until 1990, using fixed and random effects models, Oswald (1997) concludes 
that homeownership and unemployment have a positive relationship at the national level with an 
elasticity of 0.17.  Oswald claims that his findings explain the differential between Spain and 
Switzerland.  Spain has the highest unemployment and homeownership rates in Europe, while 
Switzerland has the lowest unemployment and homeownership rates.   
 Using similar data from OECD countries, Nickell (1998) supports the conclusions found 
in Oswald (1996, 1997, 1999).  He studies the correlation between homeownership and 
unemployment using data from for 20 countries belonging to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) over a five-year period between 1989 and 1994.  Nickell 
demonstrates that unemployment is positively correlated with homeownership with an elasticity 
of 0.13.   
 Using a search model for unemployed workers for 20 OECD countries, Munch et al. 
(2006) conclude that homeownership creates restrictions to labor mobility leading to higher 
reservation wages and increased joblessness.  Using the same identification strategy of Munch et 
al. (2006), Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010) use national Danish data collected from government 
statistics over eight years from 1993 until 2001 and find a positive relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment supporting the theory of Oswald (1996).   
 Using an empirical model accounting for wages and job duration, Rouwendal and 
Nijkamp (2010) conclude that homeownership heightens labor immobility - in labor markets with 




homeowners are 29 percent less likely to leave their current place of employment relative to renters 
in the first place, homeowners are also 14 percent more likely to be unemployed as a result of 
immobility.   
 Prior to Oswald (1996), Murphy and Sullivan (1985) find a positive relationship between 
high levels of homeownership and unemployment.  Using survey data from Germany and the 
Netherlands in the 1980s and early 1990s, Murphy and Sullivan (1985) demonstrate that “healthy 
housing markets” with high levels of homeownership inhibit labor mobility due to heightened 
costs associated with housing.  Focusing more specifically on the impact on immigration, Murphy 
and Sullivan (1985) find heightened costs of homeownership are a particularly large deterrent to 
relatively poorer immigrants.  Immigrants and immigrant families are more likely to choose an 
alternative location or opt to commute from a further distance into a more costly area for 
employment rather than residence purposes.   
 Using country level data from the UK during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Hughes and 
McCormick (1987) study the effect of homeownership on unemployment and find a positive 
correlation.  Hughes and McCormick conclude that British policy encouraging homeownership 
has led to an unintended “inflexibility” in the UK labor market.  Motivated by the recent rise in 
unemployment throughout Europe, Hughes and McCormick find that government policies aimed 
at increasing homeownership in the UK led to market inefficiencies and a rise in joblessness.  Prior 
to Oswald (1996), Hughes and McCormick (1987) also find a “lock-in” effect as a result of 







II.3.B. State and Regional Level Data 
 Oswald (1996) studies the correlation between homeownership and unemployment for 
19 countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
over a thirty-year period from 1960-1990.  Finding a positive correlation, Oswald concludes, “We 
can put Europe back to work…by reducing homeownership.”  The positive correlation Oswald 
reports, however, is not just among countries but also on state levels within Italy, France, 
Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, while early analysis targets the 
European labor markets, Oswald (1999) includes the western states of the U.S.  He finds a similarly 
positive relationship i.e. high homeownership and unemployment rates.   
 Using U.S. state level data over a twenty-year period from 1970 to 1990, Green and 
Hendershott (2001b) find, like Oswald, a positive relationship between unemployment and 
homeownership.  Similar to the 0.13 elasticity result in Nickell (1998), Green and Hendershott 
demonstrates that unemployment is positively correlated with homeownership with an elasticity 
of 0.18.  These two replications, Nickell (1998), and Green and Hendershott (2001b), reinforce the 
conclusions by Oswald (1999).  Green and Hendershott (2001b), however, find some 
inconsistencies across U.S. states.  In particular, they find that in some cases high homeownership 
rates do not always correlate with high unemployment.  While noting some inconsistencies or 
outlier states, Green and Hendershott (2001b) broadly support the results presented in Oswald 
(1996, 1997,1999).   
 The findings of Green and Hendershott (2001b) are similar to recent work by Laamanen 
(2013) who explores the varying mixtures of homeownership and unemployment rates at the state 
level across Europe and the U.S.  Using annual data from a panel of U.S. states, Laamanen finds a 




finds an increase in home ownership has a small, but immediate effect on unemployment.  Using 
a thirty-year lag, Laamanen concludes that the effect of a one percentage point increase in 
homeownership is estimated at a 1.7 to 2.2 percentage point increase in unemployment.  Anderson 
and Burgess (2000) also analyses data using state-level data for the United States.  While not 
specifically citing homeownership, Anderson and Burgess conclude that the natural rate of 
unemployment in a particular state is directly correlated to the flexibility of the local labor market 
or the ease with which people can relocate from state to state to search for employment.  The higher 
the inflexibility of the labor market, the higher the natural rate of unemployment.   
 Based on a regional search model, Coulson and Fisher (2009) show a positive 
relationship between homeownership and unemployment.  Studying U.S. state and metropolitan 
areas using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey and Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), Coulson and Fisher find that an elevated degree of homeownership is correlated with 
“enhanced labor market effects” including both employment volume and wages.  Coulson and 
Fisher demonstrate that unemployed homeowners are less willing to relocate to other areas offering 
either lower housing costs or rental prices, or more employment opportunities, since during such 
times homeowners can only acquire a relatively lower value for their current dwelling.  This 
decision not to relocate limits the job opportunities for homeowners and may perpetuate 
unemployment.  Thus, Coulson and Fisher (2009) find housing has a sizable effect on earnings as 
homeowners often settle for lower earnings relative to renters due to their immobility.  However, 
high-wage markets are themselves often synonymous with areas of high homeownership.  As a 
result, all else equal, homeowners on average have higher earnings than renters and are less likely 
to be unemployed.  However, higher regional homeownership rates are correlated with a greater 




 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) find labor immobility is a result of homeownership. 
Using the U.S. General Social Survey, they document that homeowners have lower mobility rates 
across states.  While DiPasquale and Glaeser find that homeownership encourages investment in 
local amenities and social capital because of immobility, barriers to mobility also lead to increased 
unemployment.  Homeownership, therefore, reduces mobility and has a negative effect on labor 
market activity.  DiPasquale and Glaeser conclude that there are two contrasting effects of 
homeownership: a high reservation wage requirement and an increase in labor force dropouts.  
There are higher costs associated with homeownership than renting. There are also high costs 
associated with relocating residences which leads to a relatively higher reservation wage 
requirement.   
 In a theoretical review of state level homeownership in the U.S., Dietz and Haurin (2003) 
find that immobility as a result of homeownership leads to higher unemployment.  Echoing the 
notion of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) that homeownership has a positive influence on local 
neighborhoods including constancy and the accretion of social capital, Dietz and Haurin ultimately 
agree with the conclusion presented in Oswald (1996) that homeownership and unemployment 
have a positive relationship.  Dietz and Haurin conclude that one of the consequences of 
homeownership is immobility and negative labor market friction or unemployment but argue 
further research is needed.   
 Following Hughes and McCormick (1987) earlier work, Cameron and Muellbauer 
(1998) look at the UK on a smaller, regional level.  Using regional data for the UK from the 1980s, 
they find that homeowners either by force or by choice shift residences less frequently than renters 
leading to increased restrictions on labor and higher unemployment.  Cameron and Muellbauer 




of unemployment causing homeownership lock-in.  An increase in unemployment leads to a loss 
of output and a higher vulnerability to inflationary pressures.   
 Using regional panel data with fixed effects model, Dohmen (2005) shows that high 
homeownership levels are positively correlated with unemployment in the UK.  However, like 
Coulson and Fisher (2009), Dohmen finds that individual homeowners are more likely to be 
employed relative to renters.  Dohmen assumes that owner and rental housing units are perfect 
substitutes. This assumption is at odds with most conventional models of homeownership which 
fails to reflect the relative premium of homeownership relative to renting.  Furthermore, Dohmen 
notes that the type of jobs lost vary as a result of a rise in homeownership.  Dohmen assumes that 
higher wealth individuals more likely own their home and work in white collar jobs as opposed to 
renters who tend to work in blue collar positions.  Nevertheless, Dohmen concludes that 
homeownership constrains career prospects by reducing labor mobility resulting in relatively 
higher rates of unemployment.   
 Using German regional data, Johnes and Hyclak (1994) support the hypothesis that high 
levels of homeownership are positively correlated with unemployment or “inferior outcomes in 
the labor market.”  Using both cross-sectional and pooled data models, Johnes and Hyclak find 
homeowners are less likely to shift locations than renters because homes cannot be overturned or 
sold without incurring search and transaction expenses.  Given this financial burden, households 
are location-bound. Furthermore, given the presumed commitment, households refrain from 
buying a home unless there is an implicit intention to settle down or a definitive commitment to a 
region for an extended duration of time. Johnes and Hyclak support the conclusion in Oswald 




Johnes and Hyclak additionally conclude, however, that the significance of the relationship is 
“marginal” at best.       
 Johnes and Hyclak assume workers accept a favorable job offer.  Portions of 
homeowners, however, turn down a favorable opportunity due to selling costs.  High selling costs 
relative to the benefits of moving may cause workers to turn down favorable employment 
opportunities. Clearly, the liquidity of the housing market influences employment and 
unemployment within a local community and in the aggregate by deterring homeowners from 
potentially accepting a favorable job.  At the individual level, as well as the regional and national 
levels, there is a positive relationship between homeownership and unemployment.   
 
II.4.  Housing Market Models: A Discussion of Reservation Price, List Price, Sale Price, 
and Days on Market (DOM)   
  As the housing market in the U.S. continues to recover in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, equity constraints and distaste for loss are factors that impact current housing demand.  
Housing equity is tangible and easily measured.  Other factors such as costs and qualitative 
variables are included in the decision of the buyer. Accounting for additional sunk costs, as well 
as the perceived value of the home by the seller, the ask price (or the list price of the seller) often 
surpasses the reservation price of the seller or the lowest offer the seller is willing to accept.  In 
the chapters to follow, the factors that affect list price and price reduction are reviewed, and the 






II.4.A. Reservation Price 
  The perception of the minimum value of the property along with opportunity cost helps the 
seller to set the reservation price.  On the one hand, an alternative to selling is renting.  The 
reservation price is affected by the current rental prices.  Relatively high rents drive the perceived 
opportunity cost higher, as well as the reservation price of the seller.  On the other hand, if the 
homeowner receives a job opportunity in another part of the country, or the homeowners’ insurance 
policy runs out when the property is vacant for a while, the reservation price of the seller declines.   
  Furthermore, the reservation price reveals information to the buyer regarding the flexibility 
of the seller and willingness to negotiate or reduce the price. Sellers with a lower reservation price 
often self-identify with a lower ask price while sellers less likely to negotiate self-classify with a 
relatively higher ask price.  Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2010) suggest a seller with a relatively 
lower reservation price is motivated by external factors such as a need to acquire a sales contract on 
the current property in order to bid on a different property.   
 
II.4.B. Setting the List Price  
 Lazear (1986) suggests that the largest challenge for a seller in the U.S. housing market 
is choosing an appropriate list price given all available information. Lazear analyzes pricing with 
this challenge and presents a two-period model with the list price of the seller the primary 
determinant of how quickly a home is sold.  In the first period, a seller is unaware of market 
valuations and arbitrarily choses a list price based on perceived value of the home.  In the second 
period, the seller acquires information on relative pricing within the market and adjusts the list to 




in the first period offer the seller limited data regarding market conditions and values. Therefore, 
in slow markets, a seller chooses a list price and is often willing to cut the list price quickly if 
incoming data suggests a need to do so. 
 Yavas and Yang (1995) study the optimal asking, or list price for a property.  Contrary 
to Lazear (1986), they conclude that sellers do not arbitrarily set their list price.  Even in the initial 
period, Yavas and Yang find that sellers base their list price on several factors including expected 
bargaining power, the realtor fee, search costs, the perceived value of the home and a professional 
valuation of the home.  Since the rate of commission is typically fixed and most home searches 
are conducted with minimal cost, these two variables have a negligible effect on the list price 
decision of the seller.1    
 
II.4.C. List Price and Days on Market (DOM) 
 A measure of days on market (DOM) is commonly used in housing market models to 
capture market activity levels.  Following their theoretical search model on optimal list price, 
Yavas and Yang (1995) look at the relationship between DOM and list price. Splitting their data 
into price quartiles, Yavas and Yang conclude that the list price sends a signal indicating the 
reservation price of the seller to potential buyers and impacts the “search intensity level” of the 
realtor.  Overvaluing a home with a relatively higher list price, increases DOM for median priced 
homes but does not impact the time on market for relatively cheap or expensive homes.  This 
suggests that the housing market for median priced homes is extremely competitive relative to the 
high and low ends of the market. In competitive housing markets, sellers are compelled to 
                                                          




appropriately price their home relative to other homes for sales within the same sector of the 
market.   
  Similar to Yavas and Yang (1995), Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) find that a rise 
in the list price impacts DOM disproportionately more in markets with little price variability.  
Furthermore, they suggest that DOM is more reflective than home prices of cyclical and brokerage-
related variables such as aggregate economic growth and mortgage financing availability, although 
not significant in list price choice. However, location and physical characteristics of the individual 
home are critical to DOM and have a substantial impact on the final sale price. Consequently, sellers 
carefully consider these aspects when determining a self-assessed value of their home and choosing 
a list price, contrary to Lazear (1986) who suggests at least in the first period, that the seller arbitrarily 
chooses a list price.  
  Glower, Haurin and Hendershott (1998), and Horowitz (1992) study price reductions and 
suggest previous price reductions for a home lowers the initial offer of a buyer.  Horowitz (1992) 
uses a framework of 10 variables consisting of price measures and property characteristics such as 
the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, square footage, the type of property and lot size.  Glower, 
Haurin and Hendershott (1998) conclude that sale prices are closely linked to both the approximated 
property value and the overvaluation by the seller, which acts as a signal to the buyer in regards to 
the degree of motivation of the seller.  A seller who is motivated to sell quickly or who has a 
predetermined sell-by date tends to overvalues less and chooses a relatively lower list price 
compared to other similarly valued homes on the market.  By choosing a lower list price, a seller 




  Inflexibility in list price often stems from inadequate information available to the seller on 
the current conditions of the housing market. With full information, expectations of the seller are 
based on both previous pricing data from sales in the area and information about current conditions.  
Overtime, both buyers and sellers have access to more data regarding individual valuations. Active 
listings information, as well as pricing information is publicly released and regularly updated. With 
just a key stroke, sellers can look for the asking price of all homes for sale in a particular area and 
more accurately set a list price reflecting market conditions.  This, in turn, causes the seller to limit 
DOM.   
  Miller and Sklarz (1986) suggest that there are two options for a home seller that can affect 
DOM.  The first option is to offer the home at a relatively high list price, attempting to obtain the 
highest probable bid, possibly above the market value of the property.  The second option is to list 
the property in line with the expected sales price to expedite the transaction and limit associated sale 
costs. The first approach prolongs the time the house is on market because an elevated list price 
reduces the pool of potential buyers, i.e. a relatively high list price compared to the assessed value 
of the home discourages potential buyers and potentially extends DOM.    The second approach, 
causes a faster exchange since a relatively low price makes the property attractive to prospective 
buyers.  Days on market are rarely zero.  Housing units are heterogeneous, so buyers need to learn 
relative market value.  “Assessed market value” is uncertain.   
  Arnold (1999) confirms the conclusion of Miller and Sklarz (1986) that the first list price 
directly influences the rate at which buyers show interest in the property for sale.  Arnold suggests 
that the seller is not always aware of the assessed property value or that an initial asking price above 
the assessed value discourages potential buyers.  However, Arnold concedes that some sellers are 




a higher bid from a narrower group of potential buyers.  The latter scenario suggests that the seller 
is confident about the uniqueness of the property.  However, if comparable attributes are offered at 
a lower price, the seller is unlikely to find a buyer.   
  Building on the thesis of Arnold (1999), Johnson, Benefield and Wiley (2007) show that 
varying DOM is not the result of overpricing.  They find that overpricing represents distinguishable 
and unique features of the individual property, as well as differences in preferences on part of both 
the seller and the buyer.  Similarly, Haurin (1988) suggests that DOM is positively associated with 
the uniqueness of a particular house.  Homes with unique characteristics are often more expensive 
with a higher sale price due to the limited supply.  They are often more illiquid due to both a higher 
price point and a limited pool of buyers, thus, extending DOM.   
  Belkin, Hempel, and McLeavey (1976) conclude that while overvaluing a home with a 
relatively high list price occurs at the individual level, it does not occur indefinitely. Consistent 
overvaluing and inflexible reservation prices limit sales activity. In the case of overvaluing, selling 
prices are expectantly above purchase prices. Conversely, elevated list prices beyond willing 
purchase prices lead to sizable price reductions if the seller is eager to sell.  Therefore, while DOM 
may be extended on an individual level as a result of overvaluing, Belkin, Hempel, and McLeavey 
(1976) show that widespread overvaluing cannot be sustained. 
  While it may ultimately slow the sale process, Benitez-Silva, Eren, Heiland and Jimenez-
Martin (2010) conclude that sellers normally over-price their home by an average 5 to 10 percent to 
compensate for assumed bargaining.  This further explains the disparity between list and transaction 
prices.  Furthermore, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) conclude that both the seller and the buyer 




allows buyers and sellers to compare prices of similar properties on the market in order to establish 
an appropriate relative value.  Finding comparable properties allows both parties to make 
assumptions regarding a likely transaction price. Sellers, however, tactfully increase the list price to 
take into account potential bargaining by the buyer. 
 Furthermore, much of the variance in DOM can be explained by the existing pool of 
buyers or lack thereof, depending on seasonal factors.  Genesove and Mayer (2001) suggest market 
seasonality directly influences housing market activity. During the fall and winter there are 
relatively fewer potential buyers in the market.  Therefore, homes for sale during the fall and winter 
often experience longer DOM, reflecting the low levels of market activity.  Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) show that sellers anticipate seasonal downturns in the housing market, as well as longer 
DOM during these periods, and consequently choose moderately high reservation prices during 
these periods of slow activity. During market troughs, or periods of declining prices, it is risky for 
sellers to have an inflexible reservation price given the limited number of buyers.  When making 
an offer, however, a buyer considers other attributes in addition to DOM. To properly gauge an 
appropriate offer, buyers look at DOM and prior price reductions.  
 The link between days on market and selling price is a subject of great discussion and 
continues to be a focus in the housing market research community.  While many sellers choose a 
list price based on current market factors, others are swayed by a presumed uniqueness of their 
property or arbitrarily choose a relatively high list price despite ample market data available to 






II.5.  Conclusion 
  Economists often observe the labor and housing markets to measure the health of a 
particular region or country.  Key indicators of economic activity are homeownership and 
unemployment rates.  Thus, they are often at the center both of economic research and policy 
makers.  In the aftermath of the housing market crash, home prices and homeownership rates are 
of particular interest.  Some suggest that increased homeownership is positively correlated with 
employment.  Others suggest a rise in homeownership leads to restrictions on labor mobility, 
locking-in workers and reducing employment.  While research has been conducted on both 
housing and labor markets separately, the relationship between homeownership and employment is 






III. The Model and Data  
III.1. Model Motivation and Variable Choice  
Modeling the relationship between homeownership and unemployment rates at the regional 
level requires a consideration of a multitude of extraneous potential determinants.  There are a few 
empirical studies that focus on estimating and identifying transaction-based liquidity aspects of 
house prices, a literature gap which reflects the complexity of the subject (Pehkonen, 1999). This 
issue, however, is not impossible all together; following Wilhelmsson (2002), an individual factor 
model and “straightforward” justification is used for variable choice.  
Regional housing markets offer different attributes such as structure type, location, and 
neighborhood quality.  These local differences justify price differences across housing markets 
and influence the clearing ability of the market.  Metro level data controls for location variances.  
Labor market characteristics are assumed to be relatively similar on the regional level including 
industry, relative wealth, locational characteristics, and income, but no assumption is made 
regarding the ability of any homeowner to withstand a price decline in value.    
The analysis focuses on five liquidity factors which include days on market (DOM), list 
price, sale price, unemployment and housing market price spread.   This model assumes that the 
regional unemployment rate has a steady state solution which is 𝑈∗. Furthermore, the model 
assumes the steady state unemployment rate accurately reflects the current market clearing ability 
of the underlying regional labor markets within state bounds as the Layard et al. (1991) model 
implies. 
The difference between the sale and list prices is a function of the time the property is listed 
but unsold calculated in days.  In an aggressive search environment, sellers post various list prices 




active housing market results in an increased number of bids whereas a slower market has fewer 
bids.  For this reason, while the time it takes to sell a property can often capture the inflexibility of 
buyers and sellers, it does not adequately capture market liquidity.  Thus, market liquidity or 
market clearing ability is modeled as the ratio between sale and list prices.  
The selling price reflects the accepted bid level and the list price reflects the offer the seller 
is willing to accept from the buyer.  A lack of liquidity leads to a divergence between the transaction 
and list prices based on a preliminarily perceived value by the seller.2  In this case, bid-ask “spread” 
is calculated as the ratio between the offer of the buyer (the sale price) and the ask price of the seller 
(the list price) and represents the cost of immediate execution.  The bid-ask spread ratio is thus, a 
measure of the ease of sales transactions or market clearing ability. 3  
Following Diaz and Jerez (2013), the housing market price spread model includes the bid-
ask price spread ratio of the property.  A smaller list-sale price ratio, larger nominal price spread, 
indicates a higher level of illiquidity.  Conversely, a larger price ratio, smaller nominal price spread, 
suggests a higher level of liquidity.  An increasingly liquid housing market or larger price ratio, i.e. 
lower nominal spread, facilitates labor mobility and reduces the lock-in effect of homeownership.4  
Thus, housing price spread ratio is expected to have a negative relationship to unemployment.   
                                                          
2 The analysis is interested in an appropriate proxy by which to measure liquidity rather than the specific determinants 
of liquidity in real estate. 
3 The analysis makes no assumption regarding the nominal price level of the buyer or the seller relative to the 
underlying value of the property.  The paper focuses exclusively on the disparity between the bid price of the buyer 
and the ask price of seller, which represents the bid-ask spread and reflects the costs of the transaction.   
4 As the bid-ask spread increases or the price ratio decreases, labor mobility decreases and unemployment rises.  The 




The bid price includes an implicit premium for the buyer and a discount for the seller for an 
instant purchase and consequently, it reflects the required concession the seller has to make for an 
instantaneous sale. Therefore, the spread between the bid and ask prices is a natural measure of 
liquidity. 
 
III.2.  The Model 
This paper follows the efficiency wage theory developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to 
explain involuntary unemployment.  Accordingly, near full-employment, it is easier to find jobs 
for the unemployed, making the cost of being fired relatively low, and therefore shirking if working 
conditions are not optimal.  In order to prevent shirking, employers have an incentive to pay their 
workers above-market wages.   
Following Oswald (1996), the efficiency-wage model is: 
(1)     𝑙𝑛𝑤 = 𝑙𝑛𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜙𝑈) 
(2)     𝜇 = 𝑐(𝑤, 𝑟, 𝑝0) 
(3)     𝑏 = 𝑏(𝜇) 
All variables are in real terms.  The variables are defined as follows:  w is the wage rate, 
b(.) is the government unemployment benefits rules, g(.) is the structure of the no shirking 
condition, 𝜙 is the search effectiveness parameter and also represents an inverse wage pressure, 
and U is the unemployment rate.  The variable 𝜇 is the technology parameter, c(.) is the unit cost 
function, r is the rental rate on capital, and 𝑝0 is the intermediate input cost. 
Equation 1 is the no-shirking condition.  It shows that at equilibrium, the efficiency wage 




unemployment rate.  Equation 2 is the zero-profit condition, which assumes constant inputs.  
Equation 3 is the government benefits rule. 
After substituting equation 2 and equation 3 into equation 1, the equilibrium unemployment 
rate is: 
(4)     𝑈∗ = 𝑈∗(𝜙, 𝑟, 𝑝0, 𝑏(𝜇)) 
At equilibrium, unemployment decreases with an increase in 𝜙, and increases in 𝑟, 𝑝0, 𝑏.  
The response to r and  𝑝0 comes from the zero-profit condition i.e., a rise in cost of production 
leads to a reduction in wages in order to restore zero profits, which leads to higher unemployment 
as wages are bid down.  The response to 𝜙 is due to the no-shirking condition which is essentially 
an inverse wage pressure variable i.e., as the cost of job search is reduced, potential employees are 
more easily matched with employers, leading to lower unemployment.  The response to 𝑏 is due 
to government benefit rules and follows Carruth et al (1996): a rise in real unemployment benefits 
reduces the cost of joblessness, causing higher unemployment.   
This paper assumes zero government benefits and price shocks.  Thus, as Reid (1972) and 
Blau (1990) argue, the effectiveness of job-finding methods is the primary determinant of 
joblessness.  This paper assumes that in the long-run 𝑈 only responds to search effectiveness.  This 
model also incorporates hysteresis following a widely-adopted approach included in Barro and 
Gordon (1981), Abraham and Katz (1984), and Staiger et al. (1997).    
The model of equilibrium unemployment is:  
(5)     𝑈𝑡
∗ = 𝑈∗(𝑈𝑡−1, 𝜙) 
Equation 5 implies that unemployment is positively affected by hysteresis (𝑈𝑢
∗ > 0) and 
negatively impacted by search effectiveness (𝑈𝜙




This paper proxies search effectiveness as the average days on markets for homes and the 
average spread price ratio between sale and list prices.  Therefore, the empirical version of the 
model is written as: 
(6)  𝑈𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑘,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑇𝑖,𝑡
4
𝑖=1 + 𝜖(𝑘,𝑡) 
where 𝑈𝑘,𝑡 is state unemployment rate at time 𝑡 in state 𝑘.  𝑈𝑘,𝑡−1 is a lagged unemployment 
in state 𝑘.  𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑘,𝑡 is the average days on market for homes in state 𝑘 at time 𝑡.  𝑃𝑙,𝑘,𝑡  is the state 
list price and 𝑃𝑠,𝑘,𝑡  is the state sale price averaged across state 𝑘.
5  𝑆𝑘,𝑡  is the average price spread 
ratio between sale and list prices at time 𝑡 in state 𝑘 defined as (𝑃𝑠,𝑘,𝑡/𝑃𝑙,𝑘,𝑡 ).    The estimation 
method is least-squares dummy variables (LSDV) with time dummies 𝑇.     
The hypothesis advanced by the theoretical model is that 𝛽3 is negative: a lower bid-ask 
price ratio (or larger nominal price spread indicating a more illiquid housing market) increases 
unemployment.   
 
III.3.  The Data 
 The data include DOM, list price, sale price and unemployment, as well as the generated 
housing price spread variable at the state level on an annual basis.  Some transformation of the 




                                                          
5 The proportional bid-ask spread for the market is created from the data on individual home sales compiled into 




III. 3. A. List and Sale Prices   
 Sale price reflects the accepted bid and the list price reflects the offer the seller is 
willing to accept from the buyer.  The list and sale prices are compiled from Zillow Real Estate 
Market Reports gathered from Zillow.com for the period 2008-2012.6  Data are provided at the 
metro level on a monthly basis.  The analysis uses more than 5,000 metro level transaction data 
to construct state level averages for each year in the U.S. for 449 metropolitan areas and 38 
states.  Transaction data are compiled from individual asset level data matched to represent an 
average housing market unit sale,7  using metro and state codes to designate the location of an 
individual house and where the transaction occurs, resulting in 190 annual transaction 
observations.8  The list and sale prices are used to create the bid-ask spread ratio.  
 
III.3.B. Price Spread   
 The price spread represents the cost of immediate execution and thus, measures the ease 
of sales transactions or market clearing ability.  Price spread is calculated as the ratio between the 
offer price of the buyer (the sale price) and the ask price of the seller (the list price) rather than the 
simple difference between the nominal values.  Price spread is comprised of list and sale prices 
across the U.S. reported at the metro level on a monthly basis from Zillow.com converted into 
annual averages. 
                                                          
6 According to Zillow.com, Zillow accounts for 10-30% of market transactions in the U.S.  
7 For some countries, it is necessary to include a dissection of the housing market into three extensive segments 
including private renters, owners, and public-sector renters.  However, this analysis focuses on homeowners so the 
rental market – both private and public - is purposefully excluded.      





1. After removing incomplete or missing data items from the available five-year time frame, 
yearly averages are constructed for both sales and list price data on the metro level from 
the reported monthly data.  The annual metro averages are constructed from the monthly 
metro level data.  Equal weights are given to each housing unit in a given metro area.  
 
2. Using annual metro level data from 2008 until 2012, the sales and list data are matched to 
construct an annual ratio between the sale and list price.  The ratio is computed as the ratio 
of the annual average sale price over the annual average list price.9  The data is matched 
on the metro basis for each of the five years from 2008 until 2012.10    For example, 
Aberdeen, Washington 2008 average sales price / Aberdeen, Washington 2008 average list 
price = Aberdeen, Washington average 2008 ratio between the sale and list price.   
 
3. Once creating metro level spread data, state averages are constructed.  The metro data are 
arranged by state; each state is represented by a series of metro level ratio data.  The metro 
level data are aggregated into a state-level average series, where each metro is given equal 
weight in calculating the state average.  While population is known, and might be used as 
a weight in a calculation of a weighted average, a preferred weight is the number of 
                                                          
9 To better account for the expected diversity of housing and labor markets across the U.S., the ratio of the averages 
is used, as opposed to the average of the ratios.  Liquidity observations diverging from the mean have much less of an 
impact in the latter calculation, potentially undermining the importance of the relationship being studied.  The ratio of 
the averages better captures the impact of housing market liquidity rather than the average of the ratios which better 
articulates the average liquidity level in housing markets across the US.  
 
10 In some instances, list and sale prices may not be recorded in the same year.  If this is the case, the transaction is 
recorded in the year of the sale.  For example, if a house is listed in September 2009 but sold in April 2010, the 




transactions and the number of transactions is unknown. It would be incorrect to assume a 
higher population predisposes a higher number of transactions.  Thus, no assumption is 
made on the relative importance of metro areas within a state.  For example, for 
Washington, the annual ratio data is averaged across Aberdeen, Bellingham, Bremerton, 
Centralia, Ellensburg, Kennewick, Longview, Moses Lake, Mount Vernon, Oak Harbor, 
Olympia, Portland, Seattle, Shelton, Spokane, Walla Walla, Wenatchee, and Yakima metro 
areas for each year over the five-year period from 2008 until 2012.   
 
4. The data collected from Zillow neither represent all transactions in a given housing market, 
nor are transactions recorded by Zillow perfectly similar across all markets.  In some cases, 
Zillow data may capture more high-end sales in one market and more low-end sales in 
another, or perhaps a larger share of sales in one metro area verses a smaller share in 
another.  Thus, the data have clear imperfections; data sources for housing market 
transactions for the metro level are extremely limited.  
 
III.3.C. Days on Market (DOM)   
 DOM is a function of the time a property is unsold measured in days.  DOM data are 
reported by Zillow Real Estate Market Reports from 2008 until 2012.  DOM data are reported at 
the state level on a monthly basis.  They are used to construct annual averages.11  Once the annual 
state DOM averages are constructed, the states are matched to the annual average state ratios 
between the list and sale price data.   
                                                          
11 The time measurement is for each day of the month as opposed to business days of the month as housing market 




III.3.D. Unemployment Rate  
 The unemployment rate reflects the current market clearing ability for the regional labor 
markets within state boundaries.  Unemployment data are readily available from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) which provides state level unemployment rates on an annual basis.  The 
unemployment rate data are obtained over a longer period from 2007 until 2012 given the inclusion 
of lagged unemployment (see appendix).  No transformation is required for the unemployment 
data.   
  
 Using Real Estate Market Reports from 2008 until 2012, state level transaction data are 
constructed across 38 states.12  The remaining 12 states and the District of Columbia are omitted 
from the analysis due to lack of data.13   
 For the regional analysis, data are separated into four regions according to the designation 
of the Census Bureau for the West, South, Northeast and Midwest as shown in Table 9, Appendix 
A.  Additionally, state data are ranked by the most and least populous states according to 2014 
Census Bureau data, also shown in Table 9.  
  
                                                          
12 Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, West Virginia 




IV.  Results 
IV.1.  State Results  
 The sample space consists of 38 state averages across five years for a total of 190 
observations. Table 1, Appendix A, presents the sample statistics. State unemployment varies from 
3.8 percent to 13.9 percent over the period 2008 until 2012.  Days on market (DOM) vary by state 
from a low of 68 to 183 days with an average duration of 125 days.  Housing price spread ratio 
averages 0.947 suggesting the sale price is often discounted by 5 percent relative to the list price.  
In particular circumstances, however, such as a bidding war or foreclosure sale, the final sale price 
exceeds the list price resulting in a price spread ratio above 1.0.  The highest in Table 1 is 1.7 
suggesting a home, for example, listed at $30,000 sells for $51,000.  Table 2, Appendix A, depicts 
the sample statistics for the trimmed data set with observations with a price spread ratio greater 
than 1.2 removed.  Table 3, Appendix A, presents the sample statistics using the alternative 
dependent variable DU calculated as the change in unemployment i.e., unemployment minus 
unemployment lagged.    
 Table 5, Appendix A, depicts the empirical results of the least-squares dummy variables 
(LSDV) regression of unemployment on housing price spread at the state level. This regression 
shows the impact of housing liquidity on unemployment.14  Later, this chapter uses this liquidity 
measure and offers empirical results of the least-squares dummy variables (LSDV) regression at 
the regional level.  The best determinant of the effect of regional housing markets on 
unemployment requires an appropriate proxy for liquidity.  The paper uses the bid-ask spread ratio 
as a proxy for housing market liquidity.   
                                                          
14 A direct Granger test answers the question, does housing price spread Granger-cause unemployment?  An F-




 Intuitively, higher priced homes tend to be more illiquid, facing a smaller pool of 
potential buyers.  Also, higher priced homes are associated with larger transaction costs and in 
general a longer period of time on the market.  However, the stickiness of the market is an inability 
to connect buyers with sellers.  Thus, independent of nominal price levels or buyer pools, the 
transaction ratio between list and sale price presents a true measure of market liquidity or market 
clearing ability. 
 A large change from the list price to sale price creates a negative market spread. This 
negative relationship suggests that as market prices adjust, sellers are slow to adapt to changing 
market conditions.  Sellers may also be unwilling to adjust their list price but it is assumed that 
sellers are motivated to sell.  However, the list price suggests the general flexibility of the seller 
and perception of market conditions. Sellers are generally more inflexible than buyers.  Sellers are 
more willing to extend the transaction period and wait for an alternative, higher bid.  This inability 
to adapt to the market equilibrium rate creates illiquidity in the market resulting in a wider nominal 
bid-ask price spread or smaller bid-ask ratio.   This bid-ask spread ratio represents the level of 
market efficiency and general market liquidity or market clearing ability.     
 As expected, the inclusion of a lagged value of unemployment, the dependent variable 
(DV), suggests a substantial amount of serial correlation in unemployment.  Unemployment at 
time t-1 enters into the equation with a coefficient of 0.9601.15  Given the large value of the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, an alternative measure of unemployment, 
DU, defined as change in unemployment, is used to affirm the impact of housing price spread ratio 
on employment; see Table 6, Appendix A.  The alternative dependent variable does not 
                                                          
15 The results of the Skewness-Kurtosis (Jarque-Bera) Test found the prob>chi2 is 0.2316.  Because the result is not 





significantly affect the coefficient of either the housing price spread ratio or DOM.  The alternative 
DV confirms the initial results reported in Table 5.  As shown in Table 5, DOM enters the equation 
with a coefficient of 0.0065 and in Table 6, using the alternative DV, DOM enters the equation 
with a coefficient of 0.0062.  Similarly, price spread ratio, as shown in Table 5, enters the equation 
with a coefficient of 0.4744.  In Table 6, using the alternative DU dependent variable, price spread 
ratio enters the equation with a coefficient of 0.4191.  In both instances the positive and relatively 
similar sized coefficients of DOM and housing price spread ratio suggests the use of 
unemployment as the DV, or the alternative DV calculated as the change in unemployment, does 
not materially impact the results of the analysis.   
 Furthermore, some states have relatively higher unemployment rates.  Those states that 
start with a higher unemployment rate have potential for a larger nominal drop in unemployment.  
The equation assumes, however, that post-recession all states follow the same downward trend.  
The model uses fixed effects to confirm a universal trend across years.   
 Seemingly not robust, the housing price spread ratio is estimated with an unexpected 
positive sign, significant at the ten percent level. The price spread ratio of housing is 0.4744 
suggesting that a lower market liquidity represented by a lower price ratio (or a higher nominal 
price spread) is not necessarily associated with higher unemployment. This result, however, does 
not hold for all regions of the country.  In Chapter 2, the results determine that increased levels of 
market inefficiency or lower market liquidity have a negative impact on employment in particular 
regions.  Intuitively, larger nominal price spreads suggest a less liquid housing market and a more 





 In some cases, the price spread ratio value is noticeably large.  A value of 1 suggests that 
the sale price matches the list price.  A coefficient above 1 suggests that the sale price is above the 
listing price.  While not uncommon for the sale price to exceed the asking price, according to the 
National Association of Realtors (NAR), a sale more than 20 percent above the original listing 
price is historically rare.  The most common causes of a sale price far exceeding a list price is a 
bidding war for a property or foreclosure sale.  In these instances, the list price is often intentionally 
set low with the expectation of multiple offers bidding up the sale price.  While relatively well 
above the initial list price, in these instances, the accepted nominal sale price is often well below 
market value.  In the aftermath of the Great Recession, foreclosure sales were not uncommon 
occurrences resulting in price ratios well above 1.2.   
 In accordance with National Association of Realtors (NAR) historical data, a price spread 
ratio above 1.2 is considered an outlier.  Testing the legitimacy of the results, Table 7, Appendix 
A, presents the regression eliminating all values above 1.2.  Rather than construct state averages 
with varying sets of metro areas in different years, which would create a heterogeneous 
comparison, transactions with price spreads above 1.2 are discarded within each metro area.  The 
number of metro areas and thus, the number of state level observations remains unchanged at 190.  
Again, the reason for an above average price spread ratio is likely to be valid – reflecting a bidding 
war or a low list price relative to market activity – rather than the result of misreporting.  However, 
an above trend ratio still may reflect underlying region specific variances that could skew the 
results.  
 Table 7 confirms that the results are little impacted by the inclusion or exclusion of 
outlying price ratio data.  Unemployment lagged, DOM and price spread ratio enter the reduced 




similar to the coefficients presented in Table 5.  Lagged unemployment, DOM and price spread 
ratio enter the equation amid the unaltered full data set, with coefficients of 0.9601, 0.0065, and 
0.4744, respectively.   
 DOM is significant and increases unemployment.  Price spread also increases 
unemployment but is not significant on the national level.  Intuitively, DOM is a time sensitive 
measure of the liquidity in the market.  The longer a home is listed for sale without an accepted 
offer, the less liquid the market.  DOM, however, is not necessarily a reflection of housing market 
liquidity.  DOM, or the duration of a sales transaction, can be impacted by financing restrictions, 
closing procedural issues, realtor inspections or other reasons, independent of market clearing 
ability.16  Furthermore, the insignificance of price spread is not the result of multicollinearity with 
a relatively low variance inflation factor.17  Additionally, other factors in the economy represented 
by time dummies had an offsetting effect on the impact of housing on unemployment.  This 
suggests that local market factors can offset the impact of an illiquid housing market on 
unemployment.  In other words, the time dummies reflect the general decline in the unemployment 
rate due to the economic recovery.       
 The housing market recovery continues in the aftermath of the Great Recession across 
many of the metropolitan areas in the country.  A large supply of new listings continues to fuel the 
housing recovery while a smaller supply of distressed properties lessens the downward pressure 
on prices.  Often homes sell more quickly in rising price environments, and subsequently sell 
slower as home prices fall.   The list price depends on market trends.   Furthermore, the list price 
                                                          
16 Industry standard accepts the use of a time measurement of sales activity along with a price measurement of 
transactions or, in this case, price spread ratio.    
 
17 The results of the variance inflation factor (VIF) test in Stata find the mean of VIF is 1.46.  VIF values greater than 





also reflects the assessed value of the property by the seller, the commission of the real-estate 
agent, the perceived bargaining power of the seller and the associated costs with selling and 
holding the housing asset.    
 
IV.2.  Regional Results 
 The data are across 449 metropolitan areas in the United States from 2008 until 2012.  
After dropping several observations for incomplete data there are 5,157 observations.  The 
estimation method is a least square regression at the state level including dummy variables for 
years.  The dependent variable is unemployment, and unemployment at time t-1 is included as a 
lagged independent variable.18  The primary independent variable of focus is housing price spread 
ratio.  Housing price spread is derived from the ratio between sale and list prices.  Housing price 
spread ratio is a proxy for liquidity in each region at t.  Tables 10 to 17, Appendix A, show the 
sample statistics and the estimation results for separate regions.   
 As anticipated, the inclusion of a lagged value of unemployment, the dependent variable 
(DV), captures a high degree of serial correlation in unemployment in the regional level as on the 
national level.  Unemployment at time t-1 has a coefficient about 0.9 for all regional areas.    
 DOM is significant and increases unemployment.  Price spread ratio also increases 
unemployment but is not significant on the national level which suggests that some regional labor 
markets are less sensitive to an illiquid housing market.  DOM has an expected positive sign 
throughout the different regions.  Intuitively, DOM is a time sensitive measure of liquidity in the 
market.  DOM is the reciprocally liquidity measure.  The longer a home is listed for sale without 
                                                          
18 Building on the classic bid-ask price model from Oswald (1996), this analysis uses unemployment and lagged 




an accepted offer, the less liquid the market.  Of the four regions, the DOM variable has the largest 
coefficient of 0.02 for the Midwestern region (see Table 17).  
 Consistent with the results on the national level, housing price spread ratio is not robust 
but estimated with different signs across regions suggesting that different regional labor markets 
react differently to local housing market conditions.  In theory, the effect may differ across regions 
for a number of reasons.  For example, in some states and regions of the country workers are 
accustomed to longer commutes (Oswald, 1999) and (Westerlund et al., 2003).  An increased 
willingness to travel for employment reduces the impact of an illiquid local housing market on 
unemployment.  Furthermore, some states have more diversified industry.  Diverse employment 
opportunities may help to alleviate unemployment independent of housing market constraints.   
 A negative sign on price spread ratio indicates that lower market liquidity represented by 
a lower price ratio (or a higher nominal price spread) is associated with higher levels of 
unemployment. Intuitively, a lower price spread ratio points to a less liquid housing market and a 
more stagnant labor turnover.  Limited labor mobility reduces effective job search and raises 
regional unemployment.  In the South (Tables 12 and 13), a lack of liquidity in the housing market 
increases unemployment.19  
 In the West region (Tables 10 and 11), price spread ratio and unemployment move in the 
same direction.20  The estimated coefficient for price spread is significant and equals to 4.58, 
indicating that a less liquid housing market is not associated with higher levels of unemployment.  
Although, in this case, despite the fact that the housing market does not clear, nearby labor markets 
                                                          
19 The South is comprised of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North 
and South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
 





in numerous large metropolitan cities or areas offer enough opportunity to limit the negative effect 
of a less liquid local housing market on regional unemployment.   The Western region of the U.S. 
has also experienced an improvement in employment since the Great Recession due to general 
trends of the economy.   
 Nevertheless, there is no intuitive relationship for the Northeast and Midwest.21  In the 
Northeast, the price spread ratio has a positive coefficient of 0.2713 (Table 15) and a coefficient 
of 0.025 in the Midwest (Table 17).  In the Northeast and Midwest, a higher level of housing 
market illiquidity (smaller price spread ratio) is not associated with a higher level of 
unemployment.      
 Regional employment markets are quite diverse.  Therefore, the effect of a less liquid 
housing market impacts regional labor markets differently.  The differences arise from diversity 
in housing opportunities, job diversity, and geography.  In particular, large populated states or 
regions with numerous large metropolitans are weakly impacted by a less liquid housing market.  
The West, for example, is dominated by large metropolitan areas across Arizona and California 
with several of the largest cities in the country within each state.  By comparison, in the South, this 
is not the case.  Rather, Southern states generally have one major city per state or in states such as 
Texas with multiple large cities the distance between each is high.  This may explain the lack of 
significance of the DOM and price estimates in the South (Tables 12 and 13).  The results for the 
Northeast and the Midwest regions are similar to the full sample results (Tables 14 to 17).  An 
increase in DOM raises unemployment, though substantially more in the Midwest.  Furthermore, 
the price spread ratio is insignificant although positive, for the Northeast and Midwest.  
                                                          
21 The Northeast is comprised of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and 





 One concludes that different regions in the U.S., particularly those with access to a 
variety of metropolitan labor markets, are unevenly impacted by a less liquid housing market.  The 
estimate of price spread ratio in the West suggests that differences in regional labor markets lead 
to different effects.  The other three regional estimates for price spread are not significantly 
different from zero.  Thus, while regional variances are expected, the differences motivate further 
research in this area.  Housing market liquidity or market clearing ability unequally impacts labor 
markets across different regions in the United States.     
 Tables 18 and 19, Appendix A, show the unemployment equation across the top 10 most 
populous states.22  As expected, given numerous large metropolitan labor markets, housing market 
liquidity does not have an effect on unemployment.  Housing price spread ratio has a statically 
insignificant coefficient of 0.2828.   
 Tables 20 and 21, Appendix A, show the unemployment equation across the 10 least 
populous states.23  As expected, regions that are less populated or have a lower number of highly 
populated metropolitan areas are more strongly impacted by a less liquid housing market.  The 
housing price ratio has a statistically significant coefficient of -0.2621, suggesting that a smaller 
price ratio (larger nominal price spread) is associated with higher unemployment.   
 Previous literature such as Nickell (1998) and Barcelo (2006) conclude homeownership 
and unemployment have a positive relationship with an elasticity of 0.13 and 0.17, respectively.  
Oswald (1996) finds that a 10-percentage point rise in homeownership is associated with an 
increase of approximately 1.4 percentage points in joblessness.  While the results of this analysis 
                                                          
22 The most populous states include California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas.  
 
23 The least populous states include Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, 




are less robust at the aggregate, they conceal important differences at the regional level: using 
transaction level data as a proxy for housing market liquidity, this analysis finds that illiquid 
housing markets restrict mobility and lead to higher unemployment in the South.  In this sense, 




     Housing research often focuses on home prices as it relates to housing and labor markets.  
Following the bid-ask price model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), this paper demonstrates that the 
spread between list and sale home prices reflects housing market liquidity.  Empirical estimates 
indicate that housing market spreads are positively related to sales prices and transaction costs are 
negatively related to housing price momentum and activity levels.  Housing market liquidity is a 
function of supply, demand and an operation that connects the two.  With low housing market 
liquidity, sellers cannot sell and buyers cannot find a home.  Essentially, housing liquidity represents 
the ability for buyers and sellers to trade in the market.  The spread between the bid and ask prices 
for a housing market transaction is an alternative and well-defined proxy of housing market liquidity 
or market clearing ability, and general market liquidity.     
 The general hypothesis is that there exists a negative relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment.  Homeownership acts as a restraint on the mobility of workers 
and thus, a catalyst for higher unemployment.  Homeownership, however, does not properly 
measure the impediment since it is not the ownership of the asset itself, but the inability to sell the 




affects labor mobility. The motivation is to present an alternative proxy for the effect of housing 
market liquidity on unemployment.   
 The appropriate instrument to measure housing market liquidity or market clearing 
ability is not well defined.  This dissertation presents an alternative measure for housing market 
liquidity in order to analyze the effect of homeownership on unemployment across the United 
States.  This paper proposes a housing market price spread variable as an appropriate measure of 
housing market liquidity.  With a proper measure of housing market liquidity, this paper assesses 
the effects of local housing markets on unemployment.  The statistical insignificance of most of 
the estimates for the price spread variable indicates that this measure is still not the best possible 
measure for housing market efficiency.   
 The results provide weak support for the expected directional relationship i.e., a more 
illiquid housing market reduces market liquidity or market clearing ability and raises 
unemployment.  A homeowner unable to complete a sale faces higher hurdles for finding better 
employment opportunities.  However, the estimated effect is statistically insignificant in most of 
the specifications examined, often with the wrong signs.  One interesting exception is for small 
housing markets, where illiquidity does lead to higher unemployment.     
 The results are consistent with the view that an illiquid housing market impairs labor 
market activity and lead to higher unemployment. Given the prominence and importance that 
developed societies place on homeownership, it is vital to further investigate this area.  A lack of 
liquidity restricts the housing activity and causes a negative impact on labor markets. This 
dissertation sparks the need for further investigation into the relationship between labor market 
liquidity and unemployment, perhaps through the use of an alternative data source including micro 




Appendix A: Results Tables 
Table 1: Base Sample Statistics 
 
 
 Table 2 below displays the total number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for each of the included variables: unemployment, DOM, and housing 
market price spread.   
 





                                                          
24 At the metro level, prior to aggregation to state level, the data set is reduced to exclude outlier data defined as price 
spread ratio greater than 1.2. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 190 8.169 1.945 3.800 13.900
Unemployment Lagged 190 7.611 2.367 3.000 13.900
DOM 190 124.873 20.703 67.673 183.000
PriceSpread 190 0.947 0.098 0.764 1.697
Sample Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 190 8.169 1.945 3.800 13.900
Unemployment Lagged 190 7.611 2.367 3.000 13.900
DOM 190 124.873 20.703 67.673 183.000





 Table 3: Sample Statistics Using the Change in Unemployment (DU) 
 
 
 Table 4 below displays the total number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for each of the included variables: unemployment-unemployment lagged 
(DU), DOM and housing market price spread.   
 









                                                          
25 At the metro level, prior to aggregation to state level, the data set is reduced to exclude outlier data defined as 
price spread ratio greater than 1.2.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment -Unemployment Lagged (DU) 190 0.559 1.663 -2.600 4.100
DOM 190 124.873 20.703 67.673 183.000
PriceSpread 190 0.947 0.098 0.764 1.697
Sample Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment -Unemployment Lagged (DU) 190 0.559 1.663 -2.600 4.100
DOM 190 124.873 20.703 67.673 183.000





Table 5: Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 
Dependent variable: Unemployment in the United States 
 
 
Table 6: Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results Using DU 




Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9601 0.0298 32.1800 0.0000 0.9013 1.0190
DOM 0.0065 0.0025 2.5300 0.0120 0.0014 0.0115
PriceSpread 0.4744 0.5043 0.9400 0.3480 -0.5206 1.4694
Year2 0.0205 0.1713 0.1200 0.9050 -0.3175 0.3586
Year3 -2.8298 0.2108 -13.4200 0.0000 -3.2457 -2.4138
Year4 -3.1009 0.2009 -15.4400 0.0000 -3.4973 -2.7045
Year5 -2.7990 0.1932 -14.4900 0.0000 -3.1801 -2.4179




Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
DOM 0.0062 0.0025 2.4300 0.0160 0.0012 0.0112
PriceSpread 0.4191 0.5037 0.8300 0.4060 -0.5746 1.4129
Year2 -0.0783 0.1549 -0.5100 0.6140 -0.3839 0.2273
Year3 -3.0220 0.1545 -19.5700 0.0000 -3.3268 -2.7173
Year4 -3.2723 0.1550 -21.1100 0.0000 -3.5781 -2.9664
Year5 -2.9405 0.1619 -18.1600 0.0000 -3.2600 -2.6211







Table 7: Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results Using Trimmed Data Set 
(Price Ratio Data< 1.2) 
Dependent variable: Unemployment in the United States 
 
 
Table 8: Trimmed Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results Using DU 
Dependent variable: The change in unemployment in the United States (DU) aggregated from 





                                                          
26 At the metro level, prior to aggregation to state level, the price ratio data are restricted to values below 1.2.    
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9628 0.0298 32.3100 0.0000 0.9040 1.0216
DOM 0.0065 0.0026 2.5100 0.0130 0.0014 0.0117
PriceSpread 0.4575 0.9147 0.5000 0.6180 -1.3474 2.2624
Year2 0.0146 0.1720 0.0800 0.9330 -0.3248 0.3539
Year3 -2.8421 0.2109 -13.4700 0.0000 -3.2583 -2.4260
Year4 -3.1141 0.2008 -15.5100 0.0000 -3.5103 -2.7179
Year5 -2.8148 0.1928 -14.6000 0.0000 -3.1953 -2.4344




Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
DOM 0.0063 0.0026 2.4200 0.0160 0.0012 0.0114
PriceSpread 0.4881 0.9158 0.5300 0.5950 -1.3188 2.2950
Year2 -0.0756 0.1563 -0.4800 0.6290 -0.3840 0.2328
Year3 -3.0215 0.1546 -19.5400 0.0000 -3.3265 -2.7164
Year4 -3.2735 0.1552 -21.0900 0.0000 -3.5797 -2.9673
Year5 -2.9459 0.1619 -18.1900 0.0000 -3.2654 -2.6264



























Table 10: West Region Sample Statistics  
 
 
Table 11: West Region Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 









                                                          
27 The West is comprised of Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington.  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 45 8.556 2.206 4.800 13.800
Unemployment Lagged 45 7.942 2.703 3.000 13.800
DOM 45 109.517 21.901 67.673 172.719
PriceSpread 45 0.942 0.085 0.822 1.267
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9052 0.0599 15.1000 0.0000 0.7837 1.0266
DOM 0.0045 0.0078 0.5800 0.5640 -0.0112 0.0203
PriceSpread 4.5826 1.4107 3.2500 0.0020 1.7241 7.4410
Year2 0.3811 0.3859 0.9900 0.3300 -0.4008 1.1629
Year3 -2.2279 0.4899 -4.5500 0.0000 -3.2205 -1.2354
Year4 -2.9089 0.4905 -5.9300 0.0000 -3.9028 -1.9150
Year5 -2.9975 0.5409 -5.5400 0.0000 -4.0936 -1.9015







Table 12: South Region Sample Statistics 
 
 
Table 13: South Region Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 









                                                          
28 The South is comprised of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 65 8.249 1.617 5.300 11.900
Unemployment Lagged 65 7.652 2.218 3.300 11.900
DOM 65 128.791 15.337 89.923 161.708
PriceSpread 65 0.934 0.091 0.764 1.235
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9230 0.0631 14.6300 0.0000 0.7967 1.0493
DOM -0.0005 0.0059 -0.0800 0.9370 -0.0123 0.0113
PriceSpread -0.1948 0.9120 -0.2100 0.8320 -2.0211 1.6315
Year2 -0.1468 0.2917 -0.5000 0.6170 -0.7309 0.4374
Year3 -2.7716 0.4054 -6.8400 0.0000 -3.5834 -1.9598
Year4 -3.2537 0.3818 -8.5200 0.0000 -4.0182 -2.4892
Year5 -3.0297 0.3608 -8.4000 0.0000 -3.7522 -2.3072







Table 14: Northeast Region Sample Statistics  
 
 
Table 15: Northeast Region Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 









                                                          
29 The Northeast is comprised of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island.   
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 35 8.143 1.673 4.800 11.800
Unemployment Lagged 35 7.460 2.122 3.400 11.800
DOM 35 136.228 21.116 99.596 183.000
PriceSpread 35 0.903 0.030 0.829 0.965
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9776 0.0670 14.6000 0.0000 0.8401 1.1150
DOM 0.0098 0.0054 1.8300 0.0790 -0.0012 0.0208
PriceSpread 0.2713 3.1586 0.0900 0.9320 -6.2096 6.7522
Year2 0.1193 0.3275 0.3600 0.7180 -0.5526 0.7912
Year3 -2.8015 0.3693 -7.5900 0.0000 -3.5593 -2.0438
Year4 -2.8312 0.3558 -7.9600 0.0000 -3.5612 -2.1013
Year5 -2.1983 0.3401 -6.4600 0.0000 -2.8961 -1.5006







Table 16: Midwest Region Sample Statistics 
 
 
Table 17: Midwest Region Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment in the Midwest Region30 
 







                                                          
30 The Midwest is comprised of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio and 
Wisconsin. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 45 7.689 2.242 3.800 13.900
Unemployment Lagged 45 7.336 2.434 3.000 13.900
DOM 45 125.738 17.535 97.308 174.917
PriceSpread 45 1.003 0.127 0.859 1.697
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9166 0.0625 14.6800 0.0000 0.7900 1.0431
DOM 0.0182 0.0079 2.3100 0.0270 0.0022 0.0341
PriceSpread 0.0250 0.8976 0.0300 0.9780 -1.7937 1.8438
Year2 0.5973 0.3770 1.5800 0.1220 -0.1667 1.3612
Year3 -2.6030 0.4609 -5.6500 0.0000 -3.5368 -1.6691
Year4 -2.4571 0.4325 -5.6800 0.0000 -3.3335 -1.5807
Year5 -1.9342 0.4447 -4.3500 0.0000 -2.8353 -1.0332







Table 18: Top 10 Most Populous State Sample Statistics  
 
 
Table 19: Top 10 State Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 
















                                                          
31 The most populous states include California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 50 9.142 1.647 6.000 13.900
Unemployment Lagged 50 8.546 2.270 4.400 13.900
DOM 50 126.671 24.451 67.673 183.000
PriceSpread 50 0.957 0.077 0.815 1.179
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9005 0.0839 10.7400 0.0000 0.7313 1.0697
DOM 0.0048 0.0043 1.1200 0.2710 -0.0039 0.0135
PriceSpread 0.2828 1.4241 0.2000 0.8440 -2.5911 3.1567
Year2 0.3187 0.4128 0.7700 0.4440 -0.5144 1.1519
Year3 -2.9110 0.5628 -5.1700 0.0000 -4.0468 -1.7753
Year4 -3.0415 0.5006 -6.0800 0.0000 -4.0517 -2.0313
Year5 -2.8942 0.4535 -6.3800 0.0000 -3.8093 -1.9791











Table 21: Bottom 10 State Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) Regression Results 
Dependent variable: Unemployment in the 10 Least Populous States32 
 
  
                                                          
32 The least populous states include Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.    
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemployment 50 7.192 2.447 3.800 13.800
Unemployment Lagged 50 6.684 2.641 3.000 13.800
DOM 50 123.981 15.609 85.308 152.563
PriceSpread 50 0.918 0.094 0.764 1.267
Sample Statistics
Variable Coef. Std.Err t p>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unemployment Lagged 0.9753 0.0521 18.7100 0.0000 0.8701 1.0804
DOM 0.0178 0.0084 2.1200 0.0400 0.0008 0.0348
PriceSpread -0.2621 1.2569 2.0900 0.0430 0.0846 5.1575
Year2 0.4094 0.3674 1.1100 0.2710 -0.3320 1.1508
Year3 -2.1326 0.4050 -5.2700 0.0000 -2.9499 -1.3153
Year4 -2.3165 0.4072 -5.6900 0.0000 -3.1382 -1.4947
Year5 -2.0692 0.4259 -4.8600 0.0000 -2.9286 -1.2098







Appendix B: Sample 2012 state data 





1 AL 132.7885 0.8599 6.90 
2 AR 122.0577 0.7926 7.20 
3 AZ 81.5577 0.8497 8.00 
4 CA 67.6731 0.9206 9.50 
5 CO 74.6346 0.8903 7.60 
6 CT 132.7500 0.8812 8.30 
7 DE 116.9135 0.9013 7.00 
8 FL 110.4038 0.8023 8.00 
9 GA 110.7115 0.8122 8.70 
10 HI 88.5385 0.7986 5.30 
11 IA 113.8558 0.9060 4.90 
12 IL 119.2308 0.9253 8.70 
13 IN 119.8846 0.8136 8.40 
14 KY 110.8462 0.9563 8.00 
15 LA 115.3077 0.9863 5.70 
16 MA 99.5962 0.8824 6.70 
17 MD 117.3462 0.8489 6.70 
18 MI 108.5577 0.9830 9.00 
19 MN 107.8654 0.9349 5.50 
20 MO 100.3846 0.9951 6.60 
21 NC 116.5769 0.8722 9.40 
22 NE 97.3077 1.0130 3.80 
23 NH 119.5577 0.8799 5.70 
24 NJ 151.4615 0.8611 9.60 
25 NV 85.3077 0.9136 10.00 
26 NY 169.3462 1.0656 8.20 
27 OK 103.4615 0.8245 5.10 
28 OR 91.2692 0.8331 8.40 
29 PA 123.8269 0.8253 8.10 
30 RI 127.9615 0.9300 10.00 
31 SC 132.8654 0.8425 8.60 
32 TN 112.5481 0.8269 7.70 
33 TX 77.9423 0.8731 6.30 
34 VA 89.9231 0.8586 5.70 
35 WA 86.9423 0.9120 7.60 
36 WI 122.8654 0.9456 6.70 





Appendix C: Sample 2012 regional metro data 





1 AL Albertville 132.7885 0.7546 6.90 
2 AL Auburn 132.7885 0.9260 6.90 
3 AL Birmingham 132.7885 0.9173 6.90 
4 AL Daphne 132.7885 0.8181 6.90 
5 AL Huntsville 132.7885 0.8734 6.90 
6 AL Mobile 132.7885 0.8659 6.90 
7 AL Montgomery 132.7885 0.8633 6.90 
8 AL Tuscaloosa 132.7885 0.8969 6.90 
9 AR Batesville 122.0577 0.6490 7.20 
10 AR Camden 122.0577 0.7346 7.20 
11 AR El Dorado 122.0577 0.8451 7.20 
12 AR Fayetteville 122.0577 0.7852 7.20 
13 AR Fort Smith 122.0577 0.8103 7.20 
14 AR Harrison 122.0577 0.6704 7.20 
15 AR Hot Springs 122.0577 0.7504 7.20 
16 AR Jonesboro 122.0577 0.8531 7.20 
17 AR Little Rock 122.0577 0.8641 7.20 
18 AR Memphis 122.0577 0.9217 7.20 
19 AR Mountain Home 122.0577 0.7163 7.20 
20 AR Paragould 122.0577 0.9109 7.20 
21 AR Pine Bluff 122.0577 0.7438 7.20 
22 AR Russellville 122.0577 0.7897 7.20 
23 AR Searcy 122.0577 0.8861 7.20 
24 AR Texarkana 122.0577 0.7050 7.20 
25 AZ Flagstaff 81.5577 0.7333 8.00 
26 AZ Lake Havasu City 81.5577 0.8650 8.00 
27 AZ Nogales 81.5577 0.9675 8.00 
28 AZ Payson 81.5577 0.7478 8.00 
29 AZ Phoenix 81.5577 0.9211 8.00 
30 AZ Prescott 81.5577 0.8657 8.00 
31 AZ Show Low 81.5577 0.8298 8.00 
32 AZ Sierra Vista 81.5577 0.8775 8.00 
33 AZ Tucson 81.5577 0.9460 8.00 
34 AZ Yuma 81.5577 0.9199 8.00 
35 CA Bakersfield 67.6731 0.9695 9.50 
36 CA Chico 67.6731 0.9485 9.50 
37 CA Crescent City 67.6731 0.8721 9.50 
38 CA El Centro 67.6731 0.9958 9.50 









41 CA Los Angeles 67.6731 0.9643 9.50 
42 CA Madera 67.6731 1.0539 9.50 
43 CA Modesto 67.6731 0.9938 9.50 
44 CA Napa 67.6731 0.7760 9.50 
45 CA Phoenix Lake 67.6731 0.8235 9.50 
46 CA Red Bluff 67.6731 0.8599 9.50 
47 CA Redding 67.6731 0.9285 9.50 
48 CA Riverside 67.6731 0.9275 9.50 
49 CA Sacramento 67.6731 0.9626 9.50 
50 CA Salinas 67.6731 0.8225 9.50 
51 CA San Diego 67.6731 0.9343 9.50 
52 CA San Francisco 67.6731 0.9553 9.50 
53 CA San Jose 67.6731 0.9441 9.50 
54 CA San Luis Obispo 67.6731 0.8723 9.50 
55 CA Santa Barbara 67.6731 0.8356 9.50 
56 CA Santa Cruz 67.6731 0.9196 9.50 
57 CA Santa Rosa 67.6731 0.8822 9.50 
58 CA Stockton 67.6731 0.9863 9.50 
59 CA Susanville 67.6731 0.8572 9.50 
60 CA Truckee 67.6731 0.8839 9.50 
61 CA Ukiah 67.6731 0.9393 9.50 
62 CA Vallejo 67.6731 0.9533 9.50 
63 CA Ventura 67.6731 0.8828 9.50 
64 CA Visalia 67.6731 0.9675 9.50 
65 CA Yuba City 67.6731 1.0003 9.50 
66 CO Boulder 74.6346 0.8465 7.60 
67 CO Canon City 74.6346 0.8686 7.60 
68 CO Colorado Springs 74.6346 0.9357 7.60 
69 CO Denver 74.6346 0.9468 7.60 
70 CO Durango 74.6346 0.9469 7.60 
71 CO Edwards 74.6346 0.6213 7.60 
72 CO Fort Collins 74.6346 0.8747 7.60 
73 CO Fort Morgan 74.6346 1.0245 7.60 
74 CO Grand Junction 74.6346 0.9318 7.60 
75 CO Greeley 74.6346 0.9396 7.60 
76 CO Pueblo 74.6346 0.8954 7.60 
77 CO Sterling 74.6346 0.9713 7.60 
78 CT Hartford 132.7500 0.9473 8.30 
79 CT New Haven 132.7500 0.9144 8.30 
80 CT New London 132.7500 0.8800 8.30 









83 DE Dover 116.9135 0.8912 7.00 
84 DE Philadelphia 116.9135 0.9320 7.00 
85 FL Arcadia 110.4038 0.7134 8.00 
86 FL Clewiston 110.4038 0.5488 8.00 
87 FL Daytona Beach 110.4038 0.8295 8.00 
88 FL Destin 110.4038 0.8364 8.00 
89 FL Fort Myers 110.4038 0.8193 8.00 
90 FL Gainesville 110.4038 0.8807 8.00 
91 FL Homosassa Springs 110.4038 0.7883 8.00 
92 FL Jacksonville 110.4038 0.8339 8.00 
93 FL Key West 110.4038 0.7317 8.00 
94 FL Lake City 110.4038 0.8221 8.00 
95 FL Lakeland 110.4038 0.8471 8.00 
96 FL Melbourne 110.4038 0.8847 8.00 
97 FL Miami-Fort Lauderdale 110.4038 0.7522 8.00 
98 FL Naples 110.4038 0.7354 8.00 
99 FL Ocala 110.4038 0.8192 8.00 
100 FL Orlando 110.4038 0.8482 8.00 
101 FL Palatka 110.4038 0.2937 8.00 
102 FL Palm Coast 110.4038 0.7711 8.00 
103 FL Panama City 110.4038 0.9137 8.00 
104 FL Pensacola 110.4038 0.8204 8.00 
105 FL Port St. Lucie 110.4038 0.8161 8.00 
106 FL Punta Gorda 110.4038 0.7260 8.00 
107 FL Sarasota 110.4038 0.8225 8.00 
108 FL Sebring 110.4038 0.9694 8.00 
109 FL Tallahassee 110.4038 0.8964 8.00 
110 FL Tampa 110.4038 0.8269 8.00 
111 FL The Villages 110.4038 0.8599 8.00 
112 FL Vero Beach 110.4038 0.7818 8.00 
113 GA Albany 110.7115 0.8676 8.70 
114 GA Athens 110.7115 0.8258 8.70 
115 GA Atlanta 110.7115 0.9356 8.70 
116 GA Augusta 110.7115 0.7924 8.70 
117 GA Brunswick 110.7115 0.8661 8.70 
118 GA Cedartown 110.7115 0.8761 8.70 
119 GA Chattanooga 110.7115 0.8339 8.70 
120 GA Columbus 110.7115 0.8138 8.70 
121 GA Cornelia 110.7115 0.5046 8.70 
122 GA Dalton 110.7115 0.7648 8.70 









125 GA LaGrange 110.7115 0.9608 8.70 
126 GA Macon 110.7115 0.8594 8.70 
127 GA Milledgeville 110.7115 0.6333 8.70 
128 GA Savannah 110.7115 0.8271 8.70 
129 GA Thomaston 110.7115 0.5359 8.70 
130 GA Thomasville 110.7115 0.7364 8.70 
131 GA Valdosta 110.7115 0.9334 8.70 
132 GA Warner Robins 110.7115 0.8384 8.70 
133 HI Hilo 88.5385 0.7372 5.30 
134 HI Honolulu 88.5385 0.9116 5.30 
135 HI Kahului 88.5385 0.8224 5.30 
136 IA Cedar Rapids 113.8558 0.9437 4.90 
137 IA Davenport 113.8558 0.7755 4.90 
138 IA Des Moines 113.8558 0.9107 4.90 
139 IA Dubuque 113.8558 0.8803 4.90 
140 IA Iowa City 113.8558 0.8777 4.90 
141 IA Omaha 113.8558 0.9953 4.90 
142 IA Waterloo 113.8558 0.8642 4.90 
143 IL Bloomington 119.2308 0.9457 8.70 
144 IL Champaign-Urbana 119.2308 1.0281 8.70 
145 IL Chicago 119.2308 0.9492 8.70 
146 IL Davenport 119.2308 0.9656 8.70 
147 IL Marion 119.2308 0.8445 8.70 
148 IL Mount Vernon 119.2308 0.9456 8.70 
149 IL Peoria 119.2308 0.9217 8.70 
150 IL Rockford 119.2308 0.9937 8.70 
151 IL Springfield 119.2308 0.9527 8.70 
152 IL St. Louis 119.2308 0.9780 8.70 
153 IL Sterling 119.2308 0.7649 8.70 
154 IN Chicago 119.8846 0.9820 8.40 
155 IN Cincinnati 119.8846 0.7583 8.40 
156 IN Greensburg 119.8846 0.7113 8.40 
157 KY Cincinnati 110.8462 0.9377 8.00 
158 KY Lexington 110.8462 0.8714 8.00 
159 KY Louisville/Jefferson County 110.8462 0.9974 8.00 
160 LA New Orleans 115.3077 0.9890 5.70 
161 MA Boston 99.5962 0.9249 6.70 
162 MA Cape Cod 99.5962 0.8481 6.70 
163 MA Pittsfield 99.5962 0.8170 6.70 
164 MA Providence 99.5962 0.9166 6.70 









167 MD Baltimore 117.3462 0.9189 6.70 
168 MD Cambridge 117.3462 0.7348 6.70 
169 MD Cumberland 117.3462 0.7022 6.70 
170 MD Easton 117.3462 0.7903 6.70 
171 MD Hagerstown 117.3462 0.9199 6.70 
172 MD Lexington Park 117.3462 0.9414 6.70 
173 MD Ocean Pines 117.3462 0.8255 6.70 
174 MD Philadelphia 117.3462 0.8349 6.70 
175 MD Salisbury 117.3462 0.8689 6.70 
176 MD Washington 117.3462 0.9245 6.70 
177 MI Adrian 108.5577 0.8744 9.00 
178 MI Allegan 108.5577 0.9244 9.00 
179 MI Ann Arbor 108.5577 0.9564 9.00 
180 MI Battle Creek 108.5577 1.0263 9.00 
181 MI Bay City 108.5577 1.1302 9.00 
182 MI Detroit 108.5577 0.9584 9.00 
183 MI Flint 108.5577 1.0018 9.00 
184 MI Grand Rapids 108.5577 0.9327 9.00 
185 MI Holland 108.5577 0.8555 9.00 
186 MI Jackson 108.5577 0.8848 9.00 
187 MI Kalamazoo 108.5577 0.9325 9.00 
188 MI Lansing 108.5577 0.9596 9.00 
189 MI Midland 108.5577 1.0611 9.00 
190 MI Monroe 108.5577 1.1231 9.00 
191 MI Muskegon 108.5577 1.0048 9.00 
192 MI Niles 108.5577 0.9407 9.00 
193 MI Saginaw 108.5577 0.9360 9.00 
194 MI Sturgis 108.5577 0.8380 9.00 
195 MI Traverse City 108.5577 0.7520 9.00 
196 MN Duluth 107.8654 0.8840 5.50 
197 MN Fargo 107.8654 0.9462 5.50 
198 MN Faribault 107.8654 0.8717 5.50 
199 MN Minneapolis-St Paul 107.8654 0.9539 5.50 
200 MN Red Wing 107.8654 1.0898 5.50 
201 MN Rochester 107.8654 0.9780 5.50 
202 MN St. Cloud 107.8654 0.9261 5.50 
203 MN Winona 107.8654 0.8607 5.50 
204 MO St. Louis 100.3846 0.9912 6.60 
205 NC Albemarle 116.5769 0.7038 9.40 
206 NC Asheville 116.5769 0.7694 9.40 









209 NC Charlotte 116.5769 0.9385 9.40 
210 NC Dunn 116.5769 0.8589 9.40 
211 NC Durham 116.5769 0.8875 9.40 
212 NC Fayetteville 116.5769 0.8752 9.40 
213 NC Forest City 116.5769 0.6389 9.40 
214 NC Greensboro 116.5769 0.9119 9.40 
215 NC Greenville 116.5769 1.0475 9.40 
216 NC Hickory 116.5769 0.7807 9.40 
217 NC Jacksonville 116.5769 0.8859 9.40 
218 NC Kill Devil Hills 116.5769 0.8074 9.40 
219 NC Morehead City 116.5769 0.8054 9.40 
220 NC New Bern 116.5769 0.8891 9.40 
221 NC Raleigh 116.5769 0.8789 9.40 
222 NC Rocky Mount 116.5769 0.9806 9.40 
223 NC Salisbury 116.5769 0.9356 9.40 
224 NC Sanford 116.5769 0.8793 9.40 
225 NC Shelby 116.5769 0.8045 9.40 
226 NC Southern Pines 116.5769 0.8489 9.40 
227 NC Statesville 116.5769 0.7971 9.40 
228 NC Thomasville 116.5769 0.7560 9.40 
229 NC Wilmington 116.5769 0.9008 9.40 
230 NC Winston-Salem 116.5769 0.8947 9.40 
231 NE Lincoln 97.3077 0.9838 3.80 
232 NE North Platte 97.3077 0.8973 3.80 
233 NE Omaha 97.3077 0.9500 3.80 
234 NH Boston 119.5577 0.8796 5.70 
235 NH Concord 119.5577 0.8551 5.70 
236 NH Laconia 119.5577 0.7611 5.70 
237 NH Lebanon 119.5577 0.8739 5.70 
238 NH Manchester 119.5577 0.9142 5.70 
239 NJ Allentown 151.4615 0.8679 9.60 
240 NJ Atlantic City 151.4615 0.8489 9.60 
241 NJ New York 151.4615 0.8917 9.60 
242 NJ Ocean City 151.4615 0.7824 9.60 
243 NJ Philadelphia 151.4615 0.9363 9.60 
244 NJ Trenton 151.4615 0.8838 9.60 
245 NJ Vineland 151.4615 0.8664 9.60 
246 NV Carson City 85.3077 0.8146 10.00 
247 NV Elko 85.3077 0.9441 10.00 
248 NV Fallon 85.3077 0.9678 10.00 









251 NV Las Vegas 85.3077 0.9420 10.00 
252 NV Pahrump 85.3077 1.1198 10.00 
253 NV Reno 85.3077 0.8775 10.00 
254 NY Albany 169.3462 0.8818 8.20 
255 NY Auburn 169.3462 0.7213 8.20 
256 NY Batavia 169.3462 1.0899 8.20 
257 NY Binghamton 169.3462 0.9139 8.20 
258 NY Buffalo 169.3462 0.8875 8.20 
259 NY Corning 169.3462 0.8688 8.20 
260 NY Cortland 169.3462 0.9324 8.20 
261 NY Elmira 169.3462 0.9421 8.20 
262 NY Glens Falls 169.3462 0.8065 8.20 
263 NY Gloversville 169.3462 0.6888 8.20 
264 NY Ithaca 169.3462 0.8088 8.20 
265 NY Jamestown 169.3462 0.7344 8.20 
266 NY Kingston 169.3462 0.8607 8.20 
267 NY New York 169.3462 0.8783 8.20 
268 NY Ogdensburg 169.3462 0.8749 8.20 
269 NY Olean 169.3462 0.7274 8.20 
270 NY Oneonta 169.3462 0.9492 8.20 
271 NY Plattsburgh 169.3462 0.7828 8.20 
272 NY Poughkeepsie 169.3462 0.9044 8.20 
273 NY Rochester 169.3462 0.9273 8.20 
274 NY Syracuse 169.3462 0.9014 8.20 
275 NY Utica 169.3462 0.8586 8.20 
276 NY Watertown 169.3462 0.8869 8.20 
277 OH Akron 112.9712 0.9068 6.80 
278 OH Ashtabula 112.9712 0.8305 6.80 
279 OH Bellefontaine 112.9712 1.0811 6.80 
280 OH Bucyrus 112.9712 1.0354 6.80 
281 OH Canton 112.9712 0.8946 6.80 
282 OH Chillicothe 112.9712 0.8501 6.80 
283 OH Cincinnati 112.9712 0.9542 6.80 
284 OH Cleveland 112.9712 0.9367 6.80 
285 OH Columbus 112.9712 0.9575 6.80 
286 OH Dayton 112.9712 0.9656 6.80 
287 OH Defiance 112.9712 1.1242 6.80 
288 OH East Liverpool 112.9712 0.8484 6.80 
289 OH Findlay 112.9712 0.8416 6.80 
290 OH Fremont 112.9712 1.1391 6.80 









293 OH New Philadelphia 112.9712 0.8327 6.80 
294 OH Norwalk 112.9712 0.9357 6.80 
295 OH Parkersburg 112.9712 0.7725 6.80 
296 OH Portsmouth 112.9712 0.8218 6.80 
297 OH Sandusky 112.9712 0.8169 6.80 
298 OH Sidney 112.9712 0.9558 6.80 
299 OH Springfield 112.9712 0.8842 6.80 
300 OH Toledo 112.9712 0.9113 6.80 
301 OH Urbana 112.9712 1.0584 6.80 
302 OH Van Wert 112.9712 0.9252 6.80 
303 OH Wapakoneta 112.9712 0.9700 6.80 
304 OH Wheeling 112.9712 0.7537 6.80 
305 OH Wilmington 112.9712 1.0536 6.80 
306 OH Wooster 112.9712 0.9386 6.80 
307 OH Youngstown 112.9712 0.8728 6.80 
308 OH Zanesville 112.9712 0.8417 6.80 
309 OK Ada 103.4615 0.7888 5.10 
310 OK Altus 103.4615 0.5856 5.10 
311 OK Ardmore 103.4615 0.7973 5.10 
312 OK Bartlesville 103.4615 0.7941 5.10 
313 OK Duncan 103.4615 0.7160 5.10 
314 OK Durant 103.4615 0.8646 5.10 
315 OK Elk City 103.4615 0.7078 5.10 
316 OK Enid 103.4615 0.8044 5.10 
317 OK Fort Smith 103.4615 0.6671 5.10 
318 OK Lawton 103.4615 0.8266 5.10 
319 OK McAlester 103.4615 0.7906 5.10 
320 OK Miami 103.4615 0.6132 5.10 
321 OK Muskogee 103.4615 1.0747 5.10 
322 OK Oklahoma City 103.4615 0.8834 5.10 
323 OK Ponca City 103.4615 0.8881 5.10 
324 OK Shawnee 103.4615 0.9292 5.10 
325 OK Stillwater 103.4615 0.9388 5.10 
326 OK Tahlequah 103.4615 0.8373 5.10 
327 OK Tulsa 103.4615 0.8931 5.10 
328 OR Albany 91.2692 0.9225 8.40 
329 OR Astoria 91.2692 0.7674 8.40 
330 OR Bend 91.2692 0.7084 8.40 
331 OR Coos Bay 91.2692 0.7900 8.40 
332 OR Corvallis 91.2692 0.8831 8.40 









335 OR Hood River 91.2692 0.8373 8.40 
336 OR Klamath Falls 91.2692 0.7847 8.40 
337 OR La Grande 91.2692 0.9143 8.40 
338 OR Medford 91.2692 0.9149 8.40 
339 OR Pendleton 91.2692 0.8148 8.40 
340 OR Portland 91.2692 0.9527 8.40 
341 OR Prineville 91.2692 0.6482 8.40 
342 OR Roseburg 91.2692 0.8278 8.40 
343 OR Salem 91.2692 0.8853 8.40 
344 PA Allentown 123.8269 0.8999 8.10 
345 PA Altoona 123.8269 0.8480 8.10 
346 PA Bloomsburg 123.8269 0.7059 8.10 
347 PA DuBois 123.8269 0.5254 8.10 
348 PA East Stroudsburg 123.8269 0.8476 8.10 
349 PA Erie 123.8269 0.9571 8.10 
350 PA Harrisburg 123.8269 0.9171 8.10 
351 PA Indiana 123.8269 0.9392 8.10 
352 PA Johnstown 123.8269 0.8069 8.10 
353 PA Lancaster 123.8269 0.8843 8.10 
354 PA Lebanon 123.8269 0.8271 8.10 
355 PA Oil City 123.8269 0.7474 8.10 
356 PA Philadelphia 123.8269 0.8711 8.10 
357 PA Pittsburgh 123.8269 0.8377 8.10 
358 PA Pottsville 123.8269 0.9214 8.10 
359 PA Reading 123.8269 0.8618 8.10 
360 PA Scranton 123.8269 0.8580 8.10 
361 PA State College 123.8269 0.8763 8.10 
362 PA Warren 123.8269 0.6681 8.10 
363 PA Williamsport 123.8269 0.7248 8.10 
364 PA York 123.8269 0.8937 8.10 
365 PA Youngstown 123.8269 0.7846 8.10 
366 RI Providence 127.9615 0.9344 10.00 
367 SC Anderson 132.8654 0.8076 8.60 
368 SC Augusta 132.8654 0.7501 8.60 
369 SC Charleston 132.8654 0.8770 8.60 
370 SC Charlotte 132.8654 0.9023 8.60 
371 SC Columbia 132.8654 0.9191 8.60 
372 SC Florence 132.8654 0.8592 8.60 
373 SC Georgetown 132.8654 0.7424 8.60 
374 SC Greenville 132.8654 0.8486 8.60 









377 SC Myrtle Beach 132.8654 0.8549 8.60 
378 SC Spartanburg 132.8654 0.8805 8.60 
379 SC Sumter 132.8654 0.8675 8.60 
380 TN Chattanooga 112.5481 0.8728 7.70 
381 TN Clarksville 112.5481 0.8311 7.70 
382 TN Cleveland 112.5481 0.8553 7.70 
383 TN Columbia 112.5481 0.8568 7.70 
384 TN Crossville 112.5481 0.6693 7.70 
385 TN Harriman 112.5481 0.6236 7.70 
386 TN Humboldt 112.5481 0.7289 7.70 
387 TN Jackson 112.5481 0.8925 7.70 
388 TN Johnson City 112.5481 0.8459 7.70 
389 TN Kingsport 112.5481 0.7625 7.70 
390 TN Knoxville 112.5481 0.7906 7.70 
391 TN La Follette 112.5481 0.4697 7.70 
392 TN McMinnville 112.5481 0.5734 7.70 
393 TN Memphis 112.5481 0.9223 7.70 
394 TN Morristown 112.5481 0.7241 7.70 
395 TN Nashville 112.5481 0.8992 7.70 
396 TN Newport 112.5481 0.7680 7.70 
397 TN Sevierville 112.5481 0.7792 7.70 
398 TN Tullahoma 112.5481 0.6558 7.70 
399 TX Dallas-Fort Worth 77.9423 0.8836 6.30 
400 VA Charlottesville 89.9231 0.9233 5.70 
401 VA Culpeper 89.9231 0.7664 5.70 
402 VA Danville 89.9231 0.8229 5.70 
403 VA Harrisonburg 89.9231 0.8906 5.70 
404 VA Kingsport 89.9231 0.7498 5.70 
405 VA Lynchburg 89.9231 0.7559 5.70 
406 VA Richmond 89.9231 0.9103 5.70 
407 VA Roanoke 89.9231 0.8388 5.70 
408 VA Virginia Beach 89.9231 0.8894 5.70 
409 VA Washington 89.9231 0.8703 5.70 
410 VA Winchester 89.9231 0.9944 5.70 
411 WA Aberdeen 86.9423 0.8589 7.60 
412 WA Bellingham 86.9423 0.9508 7.60 
413 WA Bremerton 86.9423 0.9865 7.60 
414 WA Centralia 86.9423 0.9192 7.60 
415 WA Ellensburg 86.9423 0.8719 7.60 
416 WA Kennewick 86.9423 0.8194 7.60 









419 WA Mount Vernon 86.9423 0.8437 7.60 
420 WA Oak Harbor 86.9423 0.9101 7.60 
421 WA Olympia 86.9423 0.9654 7.60 
422 WA Portland 86.9423 0.9068 7.60 
423 WA Seattle 86.9423 0.9512 7.60 
424 WA Shelton 86.9423 0.9513 7.60 
425 WA Spokane 86.9423 0.9509 7.60 
426 WA Walla Walla 86.9423 0.9342 7.60 
427 WA Wenatchee 86.9423 0.9720 7.60 
428 WA Yakima 86.9423 0.8344 7.60 
429 WI Appleton 122.8654 0.9576 6.70 
430 WI Beaver Dam 122.8654 0.9313 6.70 
431 WI Chicago 122.8654 0.9737 6.70 
432 WI Eau Claire 122.8654 0.9186 6.70 
433 WI Fond du Lac 122.8654 0.9156 6.70 
434 WI Green Bay 122.8654 0.9872 6.70 
435 WI Janesville 122.8654 0.9951 6.70 
436 WI La Crosse 122.8654 0.9021 6.70 
437 WI Madison 122.8654 0.9940 6.70 
438 WI Manitowoc 122.8654 0.8241 6.70 
439 WI Milwaukee 122.8654 0.9606 6.70 
440 WI Minneapolis-St Paul 122.8654 0.9037 6.70 
441 WI Monroe 122.8654 0.9945 6.70 
442 WI Oshkosh 122.8654 0.8759 6.70 
443 WI Racine 122.8654 0.9411 6.70 
444 WI Sheboygan 122.8654 0.8646 6.70 
445 WI Watertown 122.8654 0.9989 6.70 
446 WI Wausau 122.8654 0.9478 6.70 
447 WI Whitewater 122.8654 0.8178 6.70 
448 WV Charleston 127.8365 0.9964 7.50 
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